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GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF BANKS: A CURSE 
OR A BLESSING FOR THE UNITED STATES? 
YUEH-PING (ALEX) YANG* 
ABSTRACT 
During the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008, the Treasury in-
jected an enormous amount of capital and held equity in 707 
financial institutions to stabilize the U.S. financial system. The 
government’s large-scale ownership of banks alarmed the U.S. bank-
ing sector. The mainstream opinion in the United States strongly 
opposed this practice, mostly due to the distrust of the government 
and the fear that government intervention would jeopardize private 
shareholders’ interests. Later developments, including the Treas-
ury’s quick exit from its holdings and the Dodd-Frank Act’s dec-
laration of the end of bailouts, suggest that the U.S. government 
eventually succumbed to the mainstream opinion. 
Such sentiment against government ownership appears to 
be no more than a myth. In this Article, I provide a balanced view 
of government ownership in the U.S. context. By tracing the expe-
rience of government ownership of private corporations through-
out U.S. history, I find that the United States not only is familiar 
with this practice, but also has developed a set of governance rules 
to constrain the government’s potential abuse of its power derived 
from the ownership. Empirical evidence based on cross-country data 
also suggests that a competitive financial market, a developed 
financial system, and advanced political institutions may control 
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the downsides of government ownership of banks; the United States 
possesses all of these institutions. In fact, in this post–Financial 
Crisis era, where risk management has become a pillar of good 
bank governance, government ownership of banks can bring ben-
efits to the U.S. banking sector. Specifically, government directors 
appointed by the government owner can better represent creditors’ 
interests, supplement incomplete banking regulation and super-
vision, and reduce informational asymmetry between the banking 
regulator and banks. This, in turn, can improve poor risk man-
agement of banks and lead to greater financial stability. What the 
United States needs is not a complete rejection of government owner-
ship, but proper legal designs to control the government’s exercise 
of its ownership, such as a conditional and temporary adoption 
of government ownership, a minority-based governance structure, 
clear roles and duties of government directors, statutory access to 
fiduciary claims against government directors, and disclosure rules. 
The balanced views provided in this Article can allow the United 
States to be more comfortable with the prospective use of govern-
ment ownership in the banking sector. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Unlike governments in most jurisdictions, the U.S. govern-
ment generally resists owning firms.1 The financial crisis of 2007–
2008 (Financial Crisis), however, challenged such resistance.2 To 
stabilize the financial system, the U.S. government injected an 
enormous amount of capital into financial institutions, mostly 
banks, to maintain liquidity and protect against insolvency.3 As 
a result, the Treasury held equity in 707 U.S. financial institu-
tions, including the American International Group, Inc. (AIG), 
Citigroup, Inc. (Citigroup), and Bank of America (BoA), etc.4 In 
some instances, the Treasury even appointed its representatives 
to the board of the financial institutions.5 In effect, it became a 
giant bank-holding entity: the “Treasury Inc.”6 
Unsurprisingly, the Treasury Inc. incurred strong and 
widespread opposition within the United States. The opposition 
came from three major concerns.7 The first concern relates to the 
                                                                                                                         
1 Catherine C. Eckel & Theo Vermaelen, Internal Regulation: The Effects of 
Government Ownership on the Value of the Firm, 29 J.L. & ECON. 381, 382 (1986); 
Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2917, 2925 (2012). As a definitional matter, throughout this Article, 
the term “government ownership” refers to any level of a government’s equi-
ties in private firms, either in the form of common stock, preferred stock, or 
equity warranty, be it majority or minority, voting or non-voting. 
2 Throughout this Article, the term “Financial Crisis” refers to the global 
financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007. It originated from increasing 
subprime mortgage defaults and the reverse of decades-long increases in home 
prices (the so-called “subprime crisis”). The subprime crisis, in turn, froze up 
the credit market and then threatened the liquidity and solvency of the larg-
est global financial institutions, which eventually harmed the whole financial 
system. For a brief introduction to the Financial Crisis, as well as its impact, 
see generally HAL S. SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: 
TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 41–52 (21st ed. 2016). 
3 See id. at 82–83. 
4 See infra Section I.C. 
5 Id. 
6 See generally J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Cor-
porate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 283 (2010) [hereinafter 
Verret, Treasury Inc.]. 
7 Other concerns include the fear that the market might perceive the banks 
receiving government funds as backed by the government and thus, less likely to 
fail, and that government ownership is inherently incompatible with the U.S. 
corporate and securities laws. See J.W. Verret, The Bailout Through a Public 
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taxpayers’ interest.8 Critics were concerned that, in rescuing the 
too-big-to-fail financial institutions, the government might over-
pay the price for their equity and end up wasting the taxpayers’ 
money.9 The second concern relates to the incumbent sharehold-
ers’ interest. Critics were concerned that, in the bailout process, 
the government would nationalize the banks and thus effectively 
appropriate the equity interest of incumbent shareholders in these 
banks.10 The third concern relates to the general shareholders’ 
interest. Critics were concerned that, after acquiring the finan-
cial institutions’ ownership, the government might use their con-
trol derived therefrom to inefficiently intervene into the corporate 
interests11 or even pursue the politicians’ political agendas rather 
than shareholders’ interests.12 
                                                                                                                         
Choice Lens: Government-Controlled Corporations as a Mechanism for Rent 
Transfer, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1521, 1521 (2010) [hereinafter Verret, The 
Bailout Through a Public Choice Lens]. See generally Verrett, Treasury Inc., 
supra note 6, at 283. 
8 See, e.g., Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. 409, 409 (2012); Steven M. Davidoff, Uncomfortable Embrace: Federal 
Corporate Ownership in the Midst of the Financial Crisis, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1733, 
1756 (2011); Jeffrey Manns, Building Better Bailouts: The Case for a Long-Term 
Investment Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (2011). 
9 For instance, the Congressional Oversight Panel studied the Treasury’s 
investment during the Financial Crisis and found that the Treasury generally 
overpaid for all of the assets in the study. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FEBRUARY 
OVERSIGHT REPORT: VALUING TREASURY’S ACQUISITIONS (2009), http://www 
.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT47178/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT47178.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/5E9V-QG44]. 
10 See, e.g., Julia D. Mahoney, Takings, Legitimacy, and Emergency Action: 
Lessons from the Financial Crisis of 2008, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 299, 304 (2016); 
Andrew J. Morris, When a Bailout is a Taking: Can Takings Solve the Problem of 
the Government as Controlling Shareholder?, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 897, 898 (2014). 
11 For instance, it was reported that Citigroup repaid its TARP funds ear-
lier than expected in order to extricate itself from the Treasury’s control and 
influence, particularly with respect to the restriction on its executive compen-
sation policy. Matthew R. Shahabian, The Government as Shareholder and Politi-
cal Risk: Procedural Protections in the Bailout, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 351, 362 (2011). 
12 See, e.g., Barbara Black, The U.S. as “Reluctant Shareholder:” Government, 
Business, and the Law, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 561, 583 (2010); Marcel 
Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, 
89 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1306 (2011) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, When the Gov-
ernment Is the Controlling Shareholder]; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When 
the Government is the Controlling Shareholder: Implications for Delaware, 35 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 409, 412 (2010) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Implications for Delaware]; 
Shahabian, supra note 11, at 352; Benjamin A. Templin, The Government 
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To alleviate these concerns, the Treasury tried its best to 
assure Americans that it was reluctant to take ownership of banks. 
It declared that it would hold equities only on a short-term ba-
sis.13 During this period, it also promised that it would act as 
passively as possible to minimize intervention in the corporate 
decisions of banks.14 In general, the Treasury kept its promise: it 
exited from most of its equity holdings within two years after the 
Financial Crisis.15 Moreover, in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Congress further 
declared the policy goal of “ending bailouts” in the United States.16 
In this way, the U.S. government and Congress eventually suc-
cumbed to the opponents of government ownership. Accordingly, 
even though the Financial Crisis on its face challenged the U.S. 
government’s resistance to owning financial institutions, the devel-
opments during and after the Financial Crisis in fact affirmed, 
and even intensified, such resistance. 
It is worth noting that, amidst these critics, their ways of 
addressing government ownership of banks diverge. While the 
mainstream view proposes to simply reject this practice, an un-
neglectable number of studies take a moderate stance.17 Although 
these studies also acknowledge that the government may abuse 
its power, they propose to discipline it by imposing institutional 
constraints on the exercise of government ownership. For instance, 
to address the first concern identified above, i.e., the taxpayers’ 
interest, a number of studies have brought forward various pro-
posals to ensure that the government bails out financial institutions 
at a fair price.18 To address the second concern, i.e., the incum-
bent shareholders’ interest, the Court of Federal Claims in Starr 
International Company v. United States19 has also attempted to 
                                                                                                                         
Shareholder: Regulating Public Ownership of Private Enterprise, 62 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 1127, 1164 (2010); Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 287. 
13 See Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 331. 
14 See id. at 295–96. 
15 See infra Section I.C. 
16 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
17 See Conti-Brown, supra note 8, at 427. 
18 See, e.g., id. at 409; Manns, supra note 8, at 1369. 
19 Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428, 434 (2015). For related 
comments, see generally Mahoney, supra note 10, at 311. 
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clarify the government’s rules of conduct to discipline the gov-
ernment’s use of bailout power.20 
Interestingly, as to the third concern, i.e., the general 
shareholders’ interest under government ownership, relatively 
fewer studies propose practical institutional constraints to safe-
guard private shareholders.21 The mainstream studies in this 
aspect simply emphasize the draconian effect of government 
ownership on private shareholders’ interest.22 They hypothesize 
that the government is untrustworthy, and thus, any form of gov-
ernment ownership, a tool representing egregious market inter-
vention from the government, is undesirable.23 This mainstream 
view, however, requires some re-evaluation from at least the follow-
ing three aspects. First, the ingrained distrust of government own-
ership might be a myth. The overall empirical evidence, as will 
be demonstrated in this Article, suggests that with adequate insti-
tutional safeguards, government ownership of banks would not 
jeopardize shareholders’ interests or social welfare.24 Second, gov-
ernment ownership of banks can also produce advantages. Spe-
cifically, corporate governance of banks after the Financial Crisis 
calls for strong vehicles to prevent mismanagement of business 
directors, while government ownership could serve as this vehicle. 
Third, institutional designs, instead of wholesale rejection, might 
be a better way to control the potential disadvantages of govern-
ment ownership of banks. Proper institutional designs can safe-
guard taxpayers’ interests and incumbent shareholders’ interests 
when the government bails out banks, and they should be able 
to work in the case of general shareholders’ interests. 
In reality, the U.S. government cannot rule out the possi-
bility of future ownership of banks. The “too-big-to-fail” problem 
                                                                                                                         
20 In 2017, however, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the 
decision of the Court of Federal Claims and declared part of the decision moot. 
See Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 856 F.3d 953, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
21 For the minority opinion, see, e.g., Black, supra note 12, at 565. 
22 See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Share-
holder, supra note 12, at 1297–98; Shahabian, supra note 11, at 351–52; Verret, 
Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 287; Verret, The Bailout Through a Public Choice 
Lens, supra note 7, at 1524. 
23 See Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, 
supra note 12, at 1308. 
24 See infra Part II. 
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inherent in the U.S. banking sector remains, rendering the Dodd-
Frank Act’s efforts in restricting the government’s future bailout 
of insolvent banks25 less credible. Therefore, government owner-
ship of banks, though undesirable, might remain inevitable.26 
The U.S. banking sector should at least learn how to handle this 
practice. This post–Financial Crisis era, when we still have fresh 
memories about the fragility of financial systems as well as gov-
ernment ownership of banks, offers an appropriate time to as-
certain how to harmonize government ownership of banks with 
the U.S. financial system. 
In light of the above, I revisit the practice of government 
ownership in the United States, with a focus on the banking sec-
tor. This Article is structured as follows: Part I begins by review-
ing the evolution of government ownership in the United States 
and demonstrates that such practice, to the United States, is in fact 
not that unfamiliar. To lay down foundations for further discus-
sion, this Part also reviews associated debates over this practice 
and briefs the mainstream opinion against this practice in the 
United States. 
Part II addresses the perceived downsides of government 
ownership of banks, particularly the fear of heightened agency costs 
and political interference. I argue that, for a regulated sector like 
                                                                                                                         
25 The preamble of the Dodd-Frank Act declares that one of the Act’s objec-
tives is “to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts.” Dodd-Frank Act, 
section 1101 further amends the Federal Reserve Act, section 13(3), thereby 
restricting the Federal Reserve’s use of its emergency authority to programs 
with “broad-based eligibility” and requiring the Federal Reserve to design rules 
for ensuring that its emergency lending is “not to aid a failing financial com-
pany.” Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 716, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). This amendment aimed at foreclosing 
the support of individual insolvent banks (such as Bear Stearns and AIG 
during the Financial Crisis). SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 2, at 93–94. President 
Obama also stated that, “because of this law, the American people will never 
again be asked to foot the bill for Wall Street’s mistakes.” Remarks on Signing of 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, WHITE HOUSE 
(July 21, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks 
-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act 
[http://perma.cc/MAE6-G2XW]. 
26 For literature suspecting that the Dodd-Frank Act can end future bailouts, 
see generally Anthony J. Casey & Eric A. Posner, A Framework for Bailout 
Regulation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 536 (2015); Conti-Brown, supra note 
8, at 431; Manns, supra note 8, at 1382. 
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the banking sector, the negative effects associated with the gov-
ernment could be marginal and should not be exaggerated. After 
all, heavy regulation might have imposed a considerable amount 
of cost. In addition, although government ownership of banks ap-
pears to harm individual firm performance and overall economic 
development in a general sense, the United States may possess 
institutional infrastructures that can mitigate these downsides, 
including: (1) a competitive financial market; (2) a well-developed 
financial system; and (3) transparent and accountable political 
institutions. Accordingly, I advocate a U.S. exception to the per-
ceived downsides of government ownership of banks. 
Part III turns to the bright sides of government ownership. 
I argue that through its ownership, the government may appoint 
directors to the boards of the bailed-out banks, thereby improv-
ing poor risk management and contributing to financial stabil-
ity. Current studies of bank governance widely acknowledge that 
banks require robust risk management to protect creditors’ in-
terests as well as their own stability and survival. The practice 
entrusts this task mainly to the boards of directors of banks. The 
Financial Crisis, however, exposed the failure of current board 
practice in the United States. Business directors turned out to 
have neither the capacity to manage risks nor adequate incentive 
to resist pursuing short-term profits in order to mitigate long-term 
risks. To address this dilemma of corporate governance, govern-
ment owners, and their appointed government directors, could be 
an answer. They may have better incentives. They may supple-
ment incomplete financial supervision and thus serve as another 
channel for the financial regulator to implement its regulatory 
policies. They may further reduce the informational asymmetries 
between banks and the regulator. Accordingly, I argue that the 
benefits of government directorship of banks should not be ob-
scured. At the very least, when an individual bank goes insolvent 
and calls for the government’s bailout, that bank’s board failure 
should be well inferred, which justifies the introduction of gov-
ernment directors. 
Based on the above analyses, in Part IV, I advocate that U.S. 
society should be more positive toward government ownership of 
banks. I specifically discuss a model employing government owner-
ship and government directors, under which the regulator has the 
authority to appoint a small number of directors for a specified 
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period of time when a bank fails to properly perform its risk man-
agement. I also discuss some practical considerations related to 
government ownership of banks, including the source of talents 
of government directors, the ownership and directorship structure, 
the role and mission of government directors, access to fiduciary 
claims against government owners and directors, and disclosures. 
This Article concludes in the last section. 
Throughout this Article, I will provide a different lens for 
the United States to reflect on government ownership of banks. 
The downsides of this practice are certainly real but should not 
be exaggerated, while the bright sides should not be ignored. 
With proper legal design, government ownership of banks could 
be a blessing instead of a curse in the United States. I anticipate 
that the analysis of this Article provides some balanced views 
and allows U.S. society to be more comfortable with the prospec-
tive use of government ownership. 
I. GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
RESISTANCE TO IT 
Opponents of government ownership believe a myth that 
this governmental act is extraordinary. Indeed, compared with most 
jurisdictions around the world, this practice is relatively un-
common in the United States.27 It is, however, by no means absent. 
The U.S. government adopted this practice from time to time. In 
this Part, I will review the evolution of government ownership 
practice in the United States first, and then explore the grounds 
adopted by the mainstream opinion in the United States for oppos-
ing such practice. 
A. The Evolution of Government Ownership in the United States 
Before the Financial Crisis 
There are two major types of government ownership in the 
United States: government corporations and government owner-
ship of private corporations.28 
                                                                                                                         
27 Pargendler, supra note 1, at 2925. 
28 See id. at 2926. 
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1. The Evolution of Government Corporations 
“Government corporations” refers to corporations chartered 
by Congress or states to achieve governmental objectives.29 They 
behave like governmental agencies dressed in corporate form.30 
While I do not intend to address the practices and challenges asso-
ciated with government corporations in this Article, a brief review 
of their evolution is helpful for understanding the whole picture 
of government ownership in the United States. 
Before World War II, government corporations were common 
in the United States.31 The first government corporation was the 
Bank of the United States: in 1791, Congress authorized the U.S. 
government to subscribe 20 percent of its stock.32 After its expi-
ration, Congress chartered another government corporation, i.e., 
the Second Bank of the United States in 1816, and again author-
ized the U.S. government to subscribe 20 percent of its stock.33 
Congress also authorized the President to appoint five of the 
twenty-five directors of the Second Bank of the United States, with 
the Senate’s advice, while leaving the rest of the directors elected 
annually by shareholders other than the U.S. government.34 Other 
examples of government corporations in early ages included the 
Union Pacific Railroad35 and the Panama Railroad Company.36 
During World War I, the United States further commenced a “large-
scale use of government-controlled corporations” by incorporating 
                                                                                                                         
29 See Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 291. 
30 See Pargendler, supra note 1, at 2931. 
31 For some summaries of government corporation practice in the U.S., see 
Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 386–89 (1995). See also 
Lloyd D. Musolf, American Mixed Enterprise and Government Responsibility, 
24 W. POL. Q. 789, 795–801 (1971); Pargendler, supra note 1, at 2925–32; Verret, 
Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 289. 
32 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 386 (citing Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191, 196). 
33 See id. at 386–87. 
34 See id. (citing Act of Apr. 10, 1816, 3 Stat. 266 and 269). 
35 Congress chartered the Union Pacific Railroad in 1862 and authorized 
the President to appoint two of its fifteen directors. Id. at 387 (citing Act of 
July 1, 1862, § 1, 12 Stat. 489, 491). 
36 The Panama Railroad Company was incorporated in 1849 in the State of 
New York. The U.S. government purchased its stock from the New Panama 
Canal Company of France in 1902 and became the sole shareholder. The Secretary 
of War, as the holder of the stock, elected all of its thirteen directors. Id. 
2019] GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF BANKS 679 
the United States Grain Corporation, the United States Emergency 
Fleet Corporation, the United States Spruce Production Corpora-
tion, and the War Finance Corporation.37 Nevertheless, it dissolved 
most of them after the War ended.38 
Government corporations subsequently re-emerged dur-
ing the Great Depression.39 To stabilize the economy and make 
distress loans to farms, homeowners, banks, and other enterprises, 
the U.S. government again employed government corporations.40 
The major instance was the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
(RFC); Congress chartered it to make loans to banks, insurance 
companies, railroads, land banks, and agricultural credit organ-
izations41 and empowered it to incorporate corporations.42 Other 
instances included the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the Defense Homes 
Corporation, and the Tennessee Valley Associated Cooperatives, 
Incorporated.43 At the end of World War II, there were in total 
fifty-eight government corporations.44 
After World War II, government corporations gradually lost 
their popularity.45 Skeptics were increasingly concerned that the 
U.S. government might circumvent its accountability through in-
corporating government corporations.46 These concerns ultimately 
led to the abrogation of this practice.47 Many government corpora-
tions were dissolved.48 Although thereafter Congress still created 
                                                                                                                         
37 Id. at 388. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 The RFC, in turn, incorporated, among others, the Defense Plant Corpo-
ration, the Defense Supplies Corporation, the Metals Reserve Company, the 
Petroleum Reserves Corporation, the Rubber Development Corporation, and 
the War Damage Corporation. Id. at 389. 
43 Id. at 388–89. 
44 Id. at 389. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 389–90. Congress passed the Government Corporation Control Act 
(GCCA) in 1945, ordering the dissolution or liquidation of all government corpora-
tions except for those Congress should act to reincorporate and prohibiting the 
creation of new government corporations without specific congressional au-
thorization. Id. 
48 Id. at 389. 
680 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:667 
government corporations, their charters usually made it clear that 
they were agencies of the U.S. government.49 
Only a few ambiguities have occurred since the 1960s. One 
was the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat).50 It was 
a publicly traded corporation chartered by the Communications 
Satellite Act of 1962.51 Though private shareholders own all the 
shares of Comsat, the Comsat 1962 federal charter allowed the 
U.S. President to appoint three “public interest” directors out of 
its fifteen board members.52 This governance structure was de-
signed to ensure governmental influence and supervision without 
implicating the government’s financial interest in Comsat.53 It also 
permitted a private company to raise private capital while enjoy-
ing preferential treatment from the government.54 The U.S. gov-
ernment subsequently followed this “Comsat model” and created 
several “private” corporations.55 
Two well-known government corporations that suffered se-
vere criticism during the Financial Crisis are the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corporation (Freddie Mac).56 Congress chartered these two 
government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) to establish secondary 
market facilities for residential mortgages.57 Before the Financial 
Crisis, the government held no equity interest in these two publicly 
traded companies, but, according to their charters, the President 
                                                                                                                         
49 For instance, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 created the Overseas Pri-
vate Investment Corporation while making it clear that it is “an agency of the 
United States under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State.” Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-175, § 105, 83 Stat. 809 (1969) (codified 
as amended 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1969)). 
50 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 390. 
51 Id. at 390, 397. 
52 Id. at 390–91. 
53 Pargendler, supra note 1, at 2927. 
54 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 390. 
55 Instances include the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Legal Ser-
vices Corporation, and Amtrak. See id. at 391. 
56 Statement of FHFA Director James B. Lockhart at News Conference An-
nouncing Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FHFA (Sept. 7, 2008), 
https://www.fhfa.gov/media/publicaffairs/pages/statement-of-fhfa-director 
-james-b--lockhart-at-news-conference-announcing-conservatorship-of-fannie 
-mae-and-freddie-mac.aspx [https://perma.cc/S5DT-SRXW] [hereinafter Lockhart 
Announcement]. 
57 Id. 
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had the authority to appoint directors to their boards.58 After the 
Financial Crisis broke out, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, 
the competent authority in charge of these two GSEs, decided to 
place these two companies in its conservatorship in September 
2008.59 The Treasury, through the Making Home Affordable Pro-
gram, injected $50 billion in Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
funding, together with the Federal Reserve’s $200 billion, to sup-
port these two entities.60 Eventually, the Treasury held new senior 
preferred stock and common stock warrants amounting to 79.9 
percent of each entity.61 
Government corporations are incorporated by Congress 
through special charter laws to pursue certain governmental objec-
tives.62 While they are in corporate form, and some of them are 
even publicly traded companies, their operation often implicates 
other social or policy goals that are beyond commercial purposes; 
this complicates the corporate governance of government corpo-
rations.63 In this Article, I do not intend to address the corporate 
governance issues associated with these special corporations. 
Rather, I will focus on those ordinary private banks of which the 
government holds ownership.64 
B. Government Ownership of Private Corporations Before the 
Financial Crisis 
Beyond chartering corporations to achieve governmental 
objectives, the U.S. government occasionally holds ownership of 
ordinary private corporations as a consequence of a political or 
economic crisis. 
                                                                                                                         
58 Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 292. 
59 Lockhart Announcement, supra note 56. 
60 Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 296. 
61 Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, supra 
note 12, at 1300, 1309. For further discussion of the details of the Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac bailouts, see Casey & Posner, supra note 26, at 507–12. 
62 Richard Scott Carnell, Handling the Failure of a Government-Sponsored 
Enterprise, 80 WASH. L. REV. 565, 570–71 (2005). 
63 Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, 
supra note 12, at 1318. 
64 For discussions of government corporations, see, e.g., Carnell, supra note 
62, at 567, 569–72; Jill Spencer et al., The Cooperative Structure of the Federal 
Loan Banks: A Model for Government Sponsored Enterprises, 13 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 227, 228, 245 (2009). 
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1. RFC Investments 
The first notable instance was the RFC investments.65 As 
mentioned above, Congress established the RFC in 1932 as a gov-
ernment corporation to make loans to banks, railroads, and local 
governments. In March 1933, Congress passed the Emergency 
Banking Act, authorizing the RFC to purchase preferred stock of 
banks that ran short of capital.66 The RFC thus invested around 
$1.2 billion in U.S. banks from 1933 to 1935.67 After 1935, banks 
started to repay the government to purchase back their preferred 
stock; when the RFC was abolished in 1957, less than $5 million 
in two banks was unpaid.68 
The RFC’s approach for managing the banks is arguable.69 
The preferred stock that the RFC held carried voting rights.70 Based 
on these voting rights, the RFC often appointed new executive 
officers and directors after making an investment.71 In exchange 
for the RFC’s assistance, senior executives of the receiving banks 
even had to reduce their salaries.72 That said, the RFC Chairman 
repeatedly emphasized that the RFC did not intend to dictate 
management or coerce bank policies or bank investment.73 
2. APC Companies 
Another notable instance of government ownership of pri-
vate corporations was the Alien Property Custodian companies 
                                                                                                                         
65 For a brief account of the RFC investments and comparison of the RFC 
to the TARP, see Lissa L. Broome, Government Investment in Banks: Creep-
ing Nationalization or Prudent, Temporary Aid?, 4 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 409, 
422–24, 426–28 (2009); see also Walker F. Todd, History of and Rationales for 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 28 FED. RES. BANK CLEVELAND, ECON. 
REV. 22, 22–23, 27, 32 (1992). 
66 Emergency Banking Act, Pub. L. No. 73-1, § 304, 48 Stat. 1, 6 (1933). 
67 Broome, supra note 65, at 423. 
68 Id. at 423–24. 
69 According to one commentator, the RFC’s experience “might provide some 
comfort that government voting rights did not unnecessarily complicate the man-
agement of the banks in which the government invested.” Id. at 428. Accord-
ing to another commentator, the RFC, over time, became corrupted by politics. 
Todd, supra note 65, at 26–28. 
70 Broome, supra note 65, at 422. 
71 Id. 
72 Todd, supra note 65, at 26. 
73 Broome, supra note 65, at 427. 
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(APC companies).74 At the time the United States entered into 
World War II, it seized enemy-owned assets in the United States, 
including the stakes of German and Japanese corporations in 
seventeen U.S. companies, some public and some private.75 The 
portion of shares held by the government differed, ranging from 
35 to 100 percent.76 The actual holding period also differed, rang-
ing from one to twenty-three years.77 
In these APC companies, the government’s approach was 
seemingly hands-off. After acquiring blocks of shares, the gov-
ernment largely altered the composition of board members and 
placed its representatives on the board.78 After changing board 
members, however, the government’s role became passive. Ex-
cept for transactions not in the normal course of business, which 
required the government’s specific authorization, the government 
did not actively direct the operation of these APC companies; 
rather, it granted general authorizations to the management.79 In 
this way, the government essentially played a supervisory role in 
these companies. 
3. Continental Illinois Corporation 
Another notable example was Continental Illinois Corpo-
ration (CIC) in the 1980s. CIC was a publicly traded holding 
company of Continental Illinois National Bank in Chicago, then 
the seventh largest bank in the United States.80 Due to the bailout 
of Continental Illinois National Bank in 1984, the government 
held CIC’s ownership. 81  The FDIC purchased a $720 million 
issue of permanent, non-voting and junior preferred stock and a 
$280 million issue of permanent, adjustable-rate and cumulative 
                                                                                                                         
74 For an introduction to the APC companies, see generally Stacey R. Kole & 
J. Harold Mulherin, The Government as a Shareholder: A Case from the United 
States, 40 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1997). 
75 Id. at 1. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 6–8. 
79 Id. at 8–9. 
80 Black, supra note 12, at 576. 
81 Id. 
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preferred stock of CIC.82 This effectively gave the FDIC 80 percent 
ownership of CIC.83 
In managing CIC, the government again seemed to be rather 
hands-off. Except that the FDIC, pursuant to the terms of the 
government assistance, had a veto power over the nomination of 
any director, and its shares bore no voting rights during the hold-
ing period.84 Additionally, except in limited areas, such as the 
appointment of board members or proposed mergers, the FDIC 
did not interfere with CIC’s day-to-day operations.85 
4. Summary 
In sum, the U.S. government was not unfamiliar with the 
practice of government ownership before the Financial Crisis. In 
addition, in light of the governance practice adopted in the RFC 
investments, APC companies, and CIC, the U.S. government ap-
peared to have developed a set of guidelines for managing its 
ownership, which featured a rather hands-off approach. 
C. The “Treasury, Inc.” and the Resistance to It 
1. The “Treasury, Inc.” During the Financial Crisis 
Aside from the above cases, the U.S. government general-
ly refrained from holding ownership in private firms and private 
financial institutions.86 It, however, abandoned such self-constraint 
during the Financial Crisis. 
                                                                                                                         
82 Id. at 577. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 577–78. 
85 Id. at 578. Despite this, both the banking community and Continental 
Illinois still feared that the public would perceive CIC as a “nationalized” bank, 
which could incur some competitive disadvantages. See id. 
86 A prime exception to government-owned financial institutions is the Bank 
of North Dakota (“BND”). “The BND is a wholly state owned and operated 
bank [formed in 1919]—the only one of its kind in the United States currently,” 
and is organized to foster local economic development, small business growth, 
and localism and relational banking via community banks and credit unions. 
Marc Schneiberg, Organizational Diversity and Regulatory Strategy in Financial 
Markets: Possibilities for Upgrading and Reform, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 141, 158 
(2013). For a comprehensive introduction to the BND practice, especially how 
it performs its development mission, see id. at 157–65. 
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The bailout during the Financial Crisis, particularly the 
TARP, brought about the U.S. government’s large-scale owner-
ship of financial institutions. To provide additional liquidity to 
the credit market and prevent failures of systemically important 
financial institutions, the U.S. government launched a series of 
bailout measures during the Financial Crisis.87 Among them, Con-
gress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 
(EESA), which established the TARP in October 2008.88 Within the 
TARP framework, the Treasury launched several equity injection 
programs,89 including, among others, the Capital Purchase Pro-
gram (CPP).90 This led to the Treasury’s investment of around $205 
billion into 707 financial institutions,91 including BoA, Citigroup, JP 
Morgan, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley.92 In 
addition to the CPP, the AIG Investment Program (previously 
known as Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program) 
provided further investment in AIG,93 and the Targeted Invest-
ment Program (TIP) provided further investment in Citigroup and 
                                                                                                                         
87 For a summary of the U.S. government’s bailout measures during the 
Financial Crisis, see SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 2, at 52–93. 
88 For an introduction to the U.S. government’s investment under TARP, see, 
e.g., SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 2, at 78–82; Black, supra note 12, at 561–63. 
89 Kahan & Rock indicated that the TARP originally aimed at stabilizing 
the financial system by authorizing the Treasury to engage in the purchase of 
troubled assets from troubled financial institutions, but the Treasury took ad-
vantage of the broad definition of “troubled assets” to obtain the entitlement 
to purchase shares of troubled financial institutions. Kahan & Rock, When the 
Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, supra note 12, at 1309–10. Shahabian 
also reviewed legislative history and suggested that Congress, when passing the 
TARP, intended equity purchase to be only a secondary tool to toxic assets pur-
chase. Shahabian, supra note 11, at 357–58. 
90 Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, supra 
note 12, at 1309. 
91 Capital Purchase Program, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www 
.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment 
-programs/cap/Pages/overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/K9SC-8PSD]. 
92 For information related to the Treasury’s investment and subsequent dis-
position under the CPP, see generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MONTHLY 
REPORT TO CONGRESS: December 2018 (2018), https://www.treasury.gov/initia 
tives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/2018.12%20December%20Monthly 
%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf. 
93 Investment in American International Group, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/aig 
/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/7LK5-D6X9]. 
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BoA.94 In addition to bailing out financial institutions, the Treas-
ury later extended its equity investment to automobile indus-
tries through the newly created Automotive Industry Financing 
Program, which invested in General Motors, Inc. (GM), Chrysler 
Holding LLC (Chrysler), GM’s finance subsidiary General Motors 
Acceptance Corporation (GMAC, now Ally Financial), and Chrysler 
Financial. 95  Through these equity investments, the Treasury 
held considerable ownership of financial institutions and auto-
mobile firms.96 
The Treasury, however, identified itself as a “reluctant 
shareholder.”97 Under the CPP, the Treasury invested in financial 
institutions mostly in the form of preferred stock with warrants, 
which did not involve voting power except in certain specified 
situations.98 Under other programs, although the Treasury occa-
sionally held voting stock, it declared several principles to guide 
its actions as a shareholder. For instance, it would not interfere 
in the day-to-day management decisions and would dispose of its 
investment as soon as practicable.99 In addition, it would exercise 
its voting rights as a common shareholder only in respect of core 
shareholder matters, such as board membership, amendments to 
corporate charters or bylaws, mergers, liquidations, substantial 
asset sales, and significant common stock issuances.100 In this way, 
                                                                                                                         
94 Targeted Investment Program, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www 
.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment 
-programs/tip/Pages/overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/7NFS-SG92]. 
95 Auto Industry, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/ini 
tiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/automotive-programs/Pages/default 
.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZZ2V-ACFP]. 
96 For more detailed summaries of these bailout investments, see Davidoff, 
supra note 8, at 1736–56. See generally Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regu-
lation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 463 (2009). 
97 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FINANCIAL STABILITY, AGENCY 
FINANCIAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 41 (2009), https://www.treasury.gov 
/about/organizational-structure/offices/Mgt/Documents/OFS%20AFR%2009_24 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/UBE8-XLGC]. 
98 The Treasury, however, might exercise the voting rights when the amend-
ments to the charter or certain transactions could adversely affect the Treasury’s 
investment. Id. at 41. 
99 Id. at 42 
100 Id. The White House also declared similar sets of principles for the govern-
ment’s management of automobile restructuring initiative. See Fact Sheet: Obama 
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the Treasury again adopted a “shareholder restraint” policy: no 
interference in daily management decisions, as well as restricted 
voting rights limited to core shareholder issues.101 One commen-
tator characterized the governance model adopted by the Treas-
ury during this period as akin to a venture capital model: instead of 
taking active control of the firm, the Treasury left the manage-
ment of the rescued banks to continue to run their enterprises.102  
The specific practice of government ownership during this 
period contains at least three distinct models, as seen below. 
2. AIG: A Majority Shareholder Model 
AIG is a special example of government ownership during 
the Financial Crisis due to the government’s majority voting right. 
The Treasury bailed out AIG before the TARP came into place.103 
It engaged in several rounds of equity investment in AIG from 
September to November of 2008 and agreed on a restructuring plan 
with AIG in September of 2010.104 Initially, the Treasury held only 
non-voting preferred stock of AIG.105 Through the subsequent 
restructuring, however, the Treasury held up to 92 percent of AIG’s 
common stock together with other preferred stock in AIG and its 
two special purpose vehicles.106 Moreover, since AIG failed to pay 
four quarterly dividends on preferred shares, in April 2010, the 
                                                                                                                         
Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative General Motors Restructuring, 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-re 
leases/Pages/tg179.aspx [https://perma.cc/AK7J-BE5N]. 
101 Black, supra note 12, at 575. 
102 Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 96, at 539–40. For a different observation, 
see Davidoff, supra note 8, at 1767–72 (arguing that the government’s govern-
ance model during the bailouts did not resemble any of the private equity firms, 
institutional investors, or venture capitalists). 
103 Kimberley Amadeo, AIG Bailout, Cost, Timeline, Bonuses, Causes, Effects, 
BALANCE (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/aig-bailout-cost-timeline-bo 
nuses-causes-effects-3305693 [https://perma.cc/X7ZR-UJ2X]. 
104 This debt and equity arrangement subsequently triggered the taking 
lawsuits initiated by AIG’s shareholders against the government. For related 
discussion, see generally Mahoney, supra note 10; Morris, supra note 10. 
105 See Morris, supra note 10, at 908. 
106 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FINANCIAL STABILITY, AGENCY 
FINANCIAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 30–31 (2011), http://www.treasury 
.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/briefing-room/reports/agency_reports/Docu 
ments /2011_OFS_AFR_11-11-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DDH-YVZN]. 
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Treasury exercised its right to appoint two additional directors to 
the board of AIG.107 After a series of restructurings and dispositions, 
the Treasury finally sold its shares of AIG in December 2012.108 
To manage the AIG shares it held, the Treasury employed a 
special trust vehicle. Instead of directly holding them, it established 
the AIG Credit Facility Trust to hold AIG’s shares for the sole 
benefit of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”).109 
The purpose of this design was to prevent potential conflicts be-
tween the government’s role as both a regulator and an investor.110 
According to the trust agreement, the government would not in-
fluence the voting rights vested by the stock, and the Trust would 
leave the day-to-day management of AIG to its management.111 
This was the only bailout case during the Financial Crisis in 
which the Treasury adopted a trust structure to hold and man-
age the equities.112 
3. Citigroup: A Major Shareholder Model 
In contrast to AIG, Citigroup was a different case during the 
Financial Crisis because the Treasury did not hold majority eq-
uities.113 The Treasury, pursuant to the CPP, invested $25 billion 
in Citigroup in October 2008 in exchange for non-voting perpetual 
preferred stock.114 It invested another $20 billion in December 
2008 pursuant to the TIP in exchange for preferred stock.115 In 
July 2009, in order to strengthen its capital, Citigroup agreed to 
convert the preferred stock held by the Treasury, under the CPP, 
                                                                                                                         
107 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Names Two Appointees 
to AIG’S Board of Directors (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/press-cen 
ter/press-releases/Pages/tg623.aspx [https://perma.cc/9N2S-S7W9]. 
108 Investment in AIG: Program Status, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http:// 
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/aig/Pages 
/status.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y24E-43T6]. 
109 See Morris, supra note 10, at 907–08. 
110 AIG CREDIT FACILITY TRUST AGREEMENT 2 (Jan. 16, 2009), https://www 
.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/newsevents/AIGCFTAgreement.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4TWX-SK9H]. 
111 Id. at 2. For a further introduction to this Trust Agreement, see Kahan 
& Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, supra note 12, 
at 1351–52. 
112 See Black, supra note 12, at 579–80. 
113 See id. at 573. 
114 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 92, at 33. 
115 See id. at 56. 
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into Citigroup’s common stock, which allocated 34 percent of Citi-
group’s outstanding common stock to the Treasury.116 After this 
conversion, Citigroup accelerated its repayment to the Treasury; it 
repaid the Treasury’s TIP holding in December 2009. 117  The 
Treasury also commenced selling its CPP holdings in April 2010, 
and it completed the disposal of Citigroup’s common shares in 
December 2010.118 
In the Citigroup bailout, the Treasury, throughout the hold-
ing period, held equities in Citigroup directly.119 To prevent ex-
cessive government intervention, the Treasury agreed to limit its 
exercise of voting power.120 This included an explicit promise in 
the exchange agreement to vote in the same proportions as other 
shareholders, except for major corporate matters (such as direc-
tor election or removal, charter amendment, and major change 
to the company).121 
4. BoA: A Minority Shareholder Model 
In contrast to AIG and Citigroup, the case of BoA was dif-
ferent since the Treasury held extremely little and non-voting equi-
ties in BoA.122 The Treasury, pursuant to the CPP, invested $15 
billion in BoA’s preferred stock with warrants in October 2008, and 
another $10 billion in January 2009.123 It further invested an-
other $20 billion in BoA’s non-voting preferred stock pursuant to 
the TIP in January 2009.124 These equities, however, only repre-
sented around 0.04 percent of BoA’s total outstanding shares 
and bore no voting rights.125 Even if it exercised the warrants, 
                                                                                                                         
116 Citigroup, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 9 (Nov. 6, 2009). 
117 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 92, at 56. 
118 Id. at 56. 
119 See Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, 
supra note 12, at 1300. 
120 See id. at 1310. 
121 See Citigroup, Inc., Amendment No. 5 (Form S-4), at 75–76 (July 17, 2009). 
122 See William O. Fisher, When the Government Attempts to Change the Board, 
Investors Should Know, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 533, 543–44 (2013). 
123 See id. at 544. 
124 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 92, at 56. 
125 David M. Barnes, Note, Shotgun Weddings: Director and Officer Fidu-
ciary Duties in Government-Controlled and Partially-Nationalized Corporations, 
63 VAND. L. REV. 1419, 1439 (2010). 
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the Treasury would at most own around 5.2 percent of BoA’s 
shares.126 Therefore, the Treasury’s role in BoA was even more 
hands-off. BoA had repaid all of the Treasury’s investments by 
December 2009.127 
After the Financial Crisis was under control, the Treasury 
kept its promise to liquidate its equity holding in banks. As of 
December 31, 2018, the Treasury had collected $226.8 billion in 
proceeds as opposed to the $205 billion original investment and 
retains holdings in only three financial institutions as opposed 
to the 707 initially funded institutions.128 
5. Debates over Government Ownership in the United States 
The Treasury’s ownership of banks during the Financial Cri-
sis received strong criticism in the U.S. industries and academia. 
The majority of commentators criticized that the Treasury’s bailout 
was unnecessary and urged it to relinquish its equity holdings 
as soon as possible. They grounded their criticism on three ma-
jor concerns: the Treasury’s ignorance of taxpayers’ interests,129 
misappropriation of incumbent shareholders’ interests, 130  and 
inadequate protection of private shareholders’ interests in these 
banks.131 In this Article, I will focus on the latter concern.132 
The majority argued, in a nutshell, that when the govern-
ment employs its ownership to influence corporate policy for its 
own interest, shareholders risk diminished firm value.133 This 
                                                                                                                         
126 See id. at 1434–40. 
127 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 92, at 56. 
128 See id. at 1. 
129 See generally, e.g., Casey & Posner, supra note 26; Davidoff, supra note 
8; Manns, supra note 8. 
130 See generally, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 10. 
131 See generally Mahoney, supra note 10; Morris, supra note 10. 
132 A separate concern relates to the distortion of competition. For instance, 
the Treasury’s bailout could result in adverse selection, where customers may 
have more faith and confidence in those bailed-out banks because they have 
the government’s backup. This could give them a competitive advantage over 
their competitors that were “ironically safer prior to the bailout.” Verret, Treasury 
Inc., supra note 6, at 306; see also Verret, The Bailout Through a Public Choice 
Lens, supra note 7, at 1525. 
133 See, e.g., Shahabian, supra note 11, at 352. And such negative effects arise 
not only when the government holds majority shares (such as 79 percent in AIG 
case) or substantial shares (such as 34 percent in the Citigroup case). Even 
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argument tracks the conventional wisdom of the property rights 
theory.134 The property rights theorists believe that government-
owned firms incur more serious moral hazard problems and 
agency problems than private firms.135 In their view, a government 
is essentially owned by all diffused taxpayers.136 Since no taxpayer 
can sell his/her ownership of the government to express his/her 
dissatisfaction, the government bureaucrats and politicians who 
exercise the ownership are subject to less supervision.137 In the 
context of the banking sector, this concern is greater for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, government bureaucrats and politicians can 
disguise their political motivation more easily since the banking 
sector is more complicated and outsiders may thus suffer more 
serious informational asymmetry to supervise the quality of a 
specific bank loan.138 Second, it takes more time to ascertain the 
costs of any politically motivated loan since loans usually have a 
longer period of maturity.139 Third, government bureaucrats and 
                                                                                                                         
when the government holds few shares or even non-voting shares (such as the 
BoA case), these shareholdings, together with the government’s position as a 
regulator, the statutes and regulations associated with the TARP program, 
and the terms of bailout contract, etc., are sufficient to make the government 
a controlling, or at least influential, shareholder. See Barnes, supra note 125, 
at 1445–54; Shahabian, supra note 11, at 359–60; Verret, Treasury Inc., supra 
note 6, at 299–307. 
134 Related literature often cites Armen Alchian as the leading proponent of 
the property right theory. See generally Armen A. Alchian, Some Economics of 
Property Rights, 30 II POLITICO 816 (1965); Enrico Perotti, State Ownership: 
A Residual Role? (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 3407, 2004). 
135 See Alchian, supra note 134, at 818–19. 
136 See id. at 823. 
137 Douglas W. Caves & Laurits R. Christensen, The Relative Efficiency of Pub-
lic and Private Firms in a Competitive Environment: The Case of Canadian 
Railroad, 88 J. POL. ECON. 958, 959 (1980); see also Alchian, supra note 134, at 
822; Cotton M. Lindsay, A Theory of Government Enterprise, 84 J. POL. ECON. 
1061, 1064 (1976) (arguing that, as it is difficult for Congress to define and 
monitor social outputs, a government-owned enterprise may tend to spend costs 
on those outputs visible to Congress, which could result in social inefficiency be-
cause government-owned enterprises may not necessarily achieve social objec-
tives.); Perotti, supra note 134, at 4–5. For a more recent discussion, see, e.g., 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati et al., A Reappraisal of State-Owned Banks, 7 ECONOMIA 
209, 209 (2007). 
138 Serdar Dinc, Politicians and Banks: Political Influences on Government-
Owned Banks in Emerging Markets, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 453, 454 (2005). 
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politicians can divert funds more easily since the banking sector 
operates across the whole economy rather than in a defined in-
dustry.140 Finally, government bureaucrats and politicians may 
possess more control over the banking sector due to the higher 
entry barriers of this sector.141 
To be fair, there remain some theories supporting gov-
ernment ownership of banks.142 For instance, the regulatory theory 
argues that government ownership of banks can facilitate bank-
ing regulation and supervision.143 In this view, the government may 
have limited ability to design complete regulations ex ante.144 If the 
regulator cannot control misbehaviors of private banks through 
ex ante regulation, government ownership may vest the regulator 
with direct control over these banks and thus supplement incom-
plete regulation.145 Nevertheless, this regulatory function of gov-
ernment ownership largely depends on a benevolent government; 
the property rights theory, based on the difficulties of supervising 
the government, challenges this fundamental assumption.146 
                                                                                                                         
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 For a summary of these theories, see Perotti, supra note 134, at 4–5, 8–9; 
Yeyati et al., supra note 137, at 218–21. 
143 Perotti, supra note 134, at 5. 
144 See generally Oliver Hart et al., The Proper Scope of Government: Theory 
and an Application to Prisons, 112 Q. J. ECON. 1127 (1997); David E.M. Sap-
pington & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Privatization, Information and Incentives (Nat’l 
Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 2196, 1987). 
145 See Perotti, supra note 134, at 5. Perotti, however, rebuts that private 
ownership only reduces the government’s discretion rather than deprives the 
government of discretion. With the power of legislation, the regulator can always 
change laws to regulate private sectors and manage their misbehavior. Id. at 
11–12. 
146 Rafael La Porta et al., Government Ownership of Banks, 57 J. FIN. 265, 
266 (2002); see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Politicians and Firms, 
109 Q.J. ECON. 995, 995 (1994); Yeyati et al., supra note 137, at 221–23. 
Another theory supporting government ownership of banks is the develop-
mental theory. It argues that when a government cannot create a friendly envi-
ronment for private investment, direct government ownership in production 
can be a substitute. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer, State versus Private Ownership, 12 
J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 147–48 (1998); Joseph E. Stiglitz et al., The Role of the State 
in Financial Markets, WORLD BANK ANN. CONF. ON DEV. ECON. 1992 at 19, 19 
(1993), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/239281468741290885/pdf 
/multi-page.pdf [https://perma.cc/UCP3-GSTE]. In banking sectors, for countries 
where economic institutions have not sufficiently developed for private banks 
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According to a majority of opinions in the United States, the 
U.S. experience during the Financial Crisis supported the property 
rights theory from at least four interrelated aspects.147 First, the 
government does not maximize shareholders’ interest due to its 
different definition of utility with other shareholders.148 It might 
use shareholders’ investments for social or political purposes rather 
than for economic gains.149 Several instances during the Finan-
cial Crisis evidenced this concern. For example, it was reported that 
the President and Congress continually pressed government-owned 
banks, including Citigroup and BoA, to increase lending to small 
businesses, restrain actions against struggling homeowners, and 
maintain specific mortgage loan modification programs.150 These 
actions might achieve the social utility pursued by the government, 
but at the same time they may diminish the value of sharehold-
ers’ investment. 
                                                                                                                         
to play the crucial role of financial development for economic growth, the govern-
ment could step in by creating government-owned banks to fill this gap and 
improve the general welfare. After the Financial Crisis, some commentators 
further highlighted the countercyclical role of government-owned banks. See also 
Alejandro Micco & Ugo Panizza, Bank Ownership and Lending Behavior, 93 
ECON. LETTER 220, 220–21 (2006); Yeyati et al., supra note 137, at 224, 231–32. 
See generally Ata Can Bertay et al., Bank Ownership and Credit over the Business 
Cycle: Is Lending by State Banks Less Procyclical? (World Bank Pol’y Res., Work-
ing Paper No. WPS 6110, 2012); Martin Cihak & Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Rethinking 
the State’s Role in Finance 13–15 (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 
WPS 6400, 2013); Eva Gutierrez et al., Development Banks: Role and Mecha-
nisms to Increase their Efficiency 8–9 (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper 
No. WPS 5729, 2011). This development view, however, might sound too aggres-
sive in the United States considering that the United States has a relatively 
developed financial sector. For the studies of this development view in the U.S. 
context, see generally Schneiberg, supra note 86. 
147 See Templin, supra note 12, at 1198. 
148 See Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 316. 
149 See Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, 
supra note 12, at 1306, 1318–19; Shahabian, supra note 11, at 360–63. 
150 See Barnes, supra note 125, at 1451; Kahan & Rock, Implications for Del-
aware, supra note 12, at 410; Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Control-
ling Shareholder, supra note 12, at 1302–04; Shahabian, supra note 11, at 362. 
In the bailout of GM and Chrysler, it was reported as well that Congress pressed 
these two firms to prevent the closure of GM and Chrysler dealers. Kahan & 
Rock, Implications for Delaware, supra note 12, at 410; Kahan & Rock, When the 
Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, supra note 12, at 1304–05; Shahabian, 
supra note 11, at 362–63. 
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Second, the government is susceptible to political interfer-
ence from different interest groups. Government ownership thus 
invites political intervention into the corporate decisions of gov-
ernment-owned firms. An example was the government’s exercise 
of influence to alter the board or management of TARP-supported 
financial institutions. For instance, it was reported that the Treas-
ury, through its majority voting power derived from its bailout, 
influenced the restructuring of AIG’s board.151 This action might 
meet the expectation of the public and restore the public’s confi-
dence in the government, but it does not necessarily serve the 
best interests of the rescued banks and their shareholders. 
Third, the government is inefficient in managing banks. 
Government bureaucrats might not possess the requisite market 
expertise to manage private banks efficiently. In particular, for 
countries like the United States where the government has long 
refused to involve itself in firms’ operation, government bureau-
crats can hardly have adequate experience to handle corporate 
affairs. This could lead to waste and inefficiency. For instance, the 
Congressional Oversight Panel studied the Treasury’s investment 
during the Financial Crisis and found that the Treasury gener-
ally overpaid for all of the assets in the study.152 This evidences 
the Treasury’s inefficiency in the business world. 
Fourth, the government has conflicting interests. In gov-
ernment-owned firms, the government has a dual role as both the 
regulator and an investor. To the extent that the government’s 
investment interest in the firms affects its exercise of govern-
mental authority, the conflict of interest arises.153 For instance, 
in the bailout of Fannie Mae, it was reported that the Treasury 
blocked Fannie Mae’s contemplated sale of $3 billion in tax cred-
its to Goldman Sachs and Berkshire Hathaway because it feared 
that it would lose tax revenues should the buyers use the credits to 
offset their taxes.154 Such conflicting interests can also conversely 
benefit the government-owned banks in the sacrifice of the qual-
ity of regulations. For instance, during the bailout, the Treasury 
                                                                                                                         
151 Fisher, supra note 122, at 536–43. 
152 See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 9.  
153 See Pargendler, supra note 1, at 2919. 
154 See Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, 
supra note 12, at 1305–06. 
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issued a series of notices granting AIG a “special tax break,” which 
acknowledged AIG’s continued use of its net operating losses in 
the future.155 These notices arguably distorted section 382 of the 
Tax Code.156 Regardless in which direction, the regulator fails to 
perform effective supervision due to its conflicts of interest.157 
To be fair, not all the voices in the United States oppose 
government ownership of banks. Benjamin Templin, for instance, 
applies the stakeholder theory to justify the “policy-driven man-
agement” of the government.158 He noted that even in ordinary 
firms, as reflected in the stakeholder theory, not all shareholders 
are interested in maximizing the value of firms.159 To mitigate 
potential negative effects associated with the stakeholder theory, 
he proposed some sets of institutional norms to permit the use of 
government ownership while preserving free market principles.160 
Barbara Black proposed a more aggressive model of government 
                                                                                                                         
155 Kevin Roose, Bailout Watchdogs Criticize A.I.G. Tax Breaks, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Mar. 12, 2012, 12:15 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03 
/12/bailout-watchdogs-criticize-a-i-g-tax-breaks/ [https://perma.cc/FW86-RHS5]. 
156 For related criticism, see generally J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, 
Can the Treasury Exempt its Own Companies from Tax?: The $45 Billion GM 
NOL Carryforward, 1 CATO PAPERS ON PUB. POL’Y 1 (2011) (arguing that Sec-
tion 382 of the Tax Code prevents an acquirer from using the target’s net operat-
ing losses). If the Treasury sold the stock it holds in bailout firms, such as 
AIG or GM, it should trigger this section. Nevertheless, the Treasury issued a 
series of notices interpreting that section 382 would not apply in its cases and 
AIG and GM would be entitled to use its net operating losses after the Treas-
ury sold its stock. 
157 Moreover, some commentators also cautioned that because government 
ownership to a certain extent implies some form of government guarantee, the 
private sector will have no incentive to monitor these government-owned firms 
as well. In the end, none of the private and public sectors provide effective supervi-
sion. Gerard Caprio, Jr. & Ross Levine, Corporate Governance in Finance: Con-
cepts and International Observations, in FINANCIAL SECTOR GOVERNANCE: THE 
ROLES OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 17, 39–41 (Robert E. Litan et al. eds., 2002). 
158 See generally Templin, supra note 12, at 1185. 
159 Id. 
160 Templin raised three core principles for government ownership. First, 
there must be political insulation of the investment decision and management of 
assets by creating an independent investment authority. Second, there must 
be ethical walls between the investment authority and the regulatory agencies 
overseeing private enterprise. Third, the investment authority must act as a 
prudent investor with the goal of maximizing the return on investment. Id. at 
1131, 1203–14. 
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ownership.161 She opposed the Treasury’s “hands-off” practice dur-
ing the Financial Crisis162 and suggested that the government 
should be actively involved in corporate governance affairs when 
it is a substantial shareholder.163 She expected that, unlike ordi-
nary business directors, government directors could present the 
government’s perspectives and concerns to management and other 
members of the board.164 Emma C. Jordan followed this line of 
reasoning and suggested that the government should appoint gov-
ernment directors with a history of public service to the recipients’ 
boards on a proportional level to the amount of invested funds.165 
These arguments for government ownership of banks, however, 
are not the mainstream opinion. 
D. Summary 
To summarize, the majority opinion in the United States 
opposes government ownership of banks. Templin offered a po-
litical economy viewpoint for explaining why government owner-
ship is not well-accepted in the United States.166 This viewpoint 
observed that the U.S. economy is a typical liberal market economy, 
which is more associated with neoliberalism and a free market 
approach.167 In his view, it would be adverse to this traditional 
path if the U.S. government re-establishes some form of ownership 
of banks, an interventionist approach that is less compatible with 
the free market approach.168 
                                                                                                                         
161 Black, supra note 12, at 569. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 565. Specifically, she proposes that the government should: first, use 
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164 Id. at 594. 
165 Emma Coleman Jordan, A Fair Deal for Taxpayer Investments: Public 
Directors are Necessary to Restore Trust and Accountability at Companies 
Rescued by the U.S. Government, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 16, 2009), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/regulation/report/2009/09/16/6608/a
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Nevertheless, I wish to revisit government ownership of 
banks in the U.S. context through a more balanced lens. Admit-
tedly, government ownership introduces enhanced government in-
tervention. The government, however, is not doomed to exercise 
such intervention in a negative way as feared by the property 
rights theorists. After all, the banking sector is a regulated industry, 
which implies that this sector needs some level of government 
intervention. With proper institutional designs, the perceived 
downsides of government ownership might be controllable, and the 
government can thus exercise its ownership in a positive way 
that supplements its regulation and supervision of banks. I will 
examine them more closely in the following two Parts. 
II. THE MYTH OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP IN THE U.S. CONTEXT 
The majority opinion opposes government ownership of 
banks mainly because it distrusts the government.169 A govern-
ment, however, is not always untrustworthy. In theory, a govern-
ment can be either a “helping hand” or a “grabbing hand.” In the 
real world, whether the U.S. government is a helping or grabbing 
hand is not a problem of black or white, but a problem of degree. 
A government could be a helping hand on some occasions and a 
grabbing hand on other occasions. Specifically, government bu-
reaucrats and politicians acting on behalf of the government could 
pursue their own political agendas in some cases while serving 
the public good to society in other cases. Consequently, the bright 
sides and dark sides of government ownership could coexist and 
interplay with each other.170 What we need to ascertain is, after 
accounting for all these positive and negative effects, whether gov-
ernment ownership, in the end, brings premiums or discounts to the 
bank as well as society. This is essentially an empirical question. 
To ascertain this question in the U.S. context, I will refer-
ence available empirical findings that analyze the effects of gov-
ernment ownership of banks and apply these observations to the 
United States. I will demonstrate that the United States, unlike 
other jurisdictions in the world, has antidotal institutions to control 
the negative effects of government ownership. In other words, 
the majority view could be exaggerating these negative effects. 
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A. Empirical Evidence of Government Ownership of Banks:  
Developed Countries Exception? 
Methodologically, since the U.S. banking sector is the sub-
ject of this Article, I should inquire into those U.S.-specific stud-
ies that observe the effect of government ownership of U.S. banks. 
Such studies, however, hardly exist due to the rare precedent and 
short implementation of this practice in the United States. Con-
sequently, I instead adopt a comparative approach that turns to 
cross-countries evidence for shedding some light here. 
Empirical studies in the early 2000s almost all consistently 
found that government ownership of banks correlated with en-
hanced financial risks and lower financial and economic develop-
ment. For instance, Gerard Caprio and Maria Soledad Martinez 
Peria, based on data of banks in 64 countries over the period of 
1980–1997, found that government ownership of banks posed 
danger to financial stability and thus significantly increased the 
likelihood and fiscal costs of a banking crisis.171 Rafael La Porta 
et al. found, based on data of government-owned banks from 92 
countries around the world, that government ownership of banks 
in 1970 was associated with slower subsequent financial devel-
opment and lower subsequent growth in per capita income.172 
James R. Barth et al., based on data of bank regulation and su-
pervision in 107 countries, also found that government ownership 
of banks was positively associated with the level of nonperforming 
loans in an economy.173 According to these studies, government 
ownership of banks is negative.174 
                                                                                                                         
171 Gerard Caprio & Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, Avoiding Disasters: Policies 
to Reduce the Risk of Banking Crises 8–15 (World Bank mimeo & Egyptian Ctr. 
for Econ. Stud., Working Paper No. 47, 2000). 
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A closer examination of empirical evidence, however, chal-
lenges the above general finding. The negative effects of gov-
ernment-owned banks mostly appeared in developing countries 
while disappearing in developed countries. For instance, Rafael 
La Porta et al. found that the negative effects associated with 
government ownership of banks were more serious in relatively 
poor countries, relatively financially underdeveloped countries, and 
countries with poor protection of property rights.175 Dinc, based 
on data of banks in 36 countries (19 emerging countries and 17 
developed countries), found that government-owned banks signifi-
cantly increased their lending in election years, which suggested 
that political motivations influenced their actions; however, in de-
veloped countries, he failed to detect such election-year increase.176 
Alejandro Micco et al., based on financial information from 179 
countries, also found that government-owned banks in developing 
countries were associated with lower profitability and higher costs 
than their private counterparts, and such performance differences 
increased during election years; but again, they failed to find any 
strong correlation in industrial countries.177 In a country-specific 
study, Yener Altunbas et al., based on data of German banks, failed 
to find strong evidence showing that private banks outperformed 
government-owned banks.178 These empirical findings suggest that 
the negative effects of government ownership of banks are asso-
ciated with the development status of individual countries.179 
These findings lead us to question whether there are some 
country-specific institutional factors that may mitigate the neg-
ative effects of government ownership of banks. La Porta et al. 
suggested that this difference might result from the better access 
                                                                                                                         
Regulation and Ownership Affect Performance and Stability? 27 (The World Bank 
Dev. Res. Group, Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 2325, 2000); Alejandro Rainer 
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175 La Porta et al., supra note 146, at 290. 
176 Dinc, supra note 138, at 475–76. 
177 Micco et al., supra note 174, at 227–32. 
178 See Yener Altunbas et al., Bank Ownership and Efficiency, 33 J. MONEY, 
CREDIT & BANKING 926, 936, 938, 944 (2001). 
179 In fact, recent empirical evidence also presents some results favorable 
to government ownership of banks. See, e.g., Chung-Hua Shen et al., The 
Government’s Role in Government-owned Banks, 45 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 307, 
319–27, 338–39 (2013); Yeyati et al., supra note 137, at 237–44. 
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to foreign capital in richer countries.180 Micco et al. instead offered 
two possible explanations. First, high-income countries might be 
better equipped to deal with distortions arising from government 
ownership of banks; therefore, governance issues are less serious in 
industrial countries.181 Second, in industrial countries, government-
owned banks have ceased to play a developmental role; therefore, 
their actions mimic the behavior of private banks.182 Dinc, in con-
trast, considered that his findings did not result from better legal 
and political institutions in developed countries, but simply from 
some methodological problems.183 Nevertheless, none of them pro-
vided further studies to support their explanations. 
The above empirical findings suggest that the hypothesis 
held by the mainstream opinion is flawed. Government ownership 
of banks is not doomed to produce negative results in the United 
States. In the following parts, I will demonstrate that the United 
States may possess some antidotal institutions to mitigate these 
perceived negative effects. 
B. Government Ownership of Banks in the U.S. Context 
1. The Potential Exaggeration of the Perceived Negative  
Effects 
As mentioned above, opponents of government ownership 
of banks in the United States draw on the property rights theory 
to justify their position.184 According to them, the government is 
unable to maximize shareholders’ interests, falls prey to political 
influence, behaves inefficiently, and involves conflicts of interest.185 
Its decisions in government-owned firms may be politically de-
termined and susceptible to capture.186 
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181 Micco et al., supra note 174, at 227. 
182 Id. 
183 Dinc, supra note 138, at 476 (arguing that the lack of an election-year effect 
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These, however, concerns could be exaggerated. As Mariana 
Pargendler pointed out, although there is a difference between 
government bureaucrats and private businesspersons in terms 
of their motives, it is often easy to overstate the extent of such 
difference.187 The opportunism of government-owned firms may 
well mirror that of private controlling shareholders,188 which may, 
in turn, mirror that of managers.189 In other words, failure to max-
imize firm profits is not unique to the government owner.190 “[T]oo 
much emphasis on the differences between private and public 
control of enterprise has largely obscured their similarities.”191 
Moreover, mainstream opinion might also overlook the in-
terplay between government supervision vis-à-vis government 
ownership and thus exaggerate the negative effect of the latter. 
Notably, the banking sector, the subject of this Article, is a highly 
regulated sector that is subject to heavy governmental regulation 
and supervision.192 Moreover, the banking regulator often has con-
siderable discretion to promulgate new banking regulations and 
supervise banks as it deems proper.193 Accordingly, with or with-
out ownership, the government, as the regulator, already possesses 
considerable authority to intervene in banks’ corporate decisions. 
For this reason, the perceived negative effects associated with gov-
ernment ownership, if any, could be marginal. 
The controversial merger between BoA and Merrill Lynch 
during the Financial Crisis can illustrate this point.194 When BoA’s 
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merger agreement, caused BoA to consider invoking the material adverse change 
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management considered terminating the deal, the Federal Reserve 
threatened to use its authority as a banking regulator to remove 
BoA’s senior management and board members.195 Some commenta-
tors took this case as an example illustrating how government 
ownership of a firm, despite how limited such ownership is, could 
intervene in the corporate decisions of that firm.196 However, the 
Federal Reserve’s threat was real not because of its ownership of 
BoA; as a matter of fact, at that time, the Federal Reserve had no 
voting power in BoA to vote out the management and board mem-
bers.197 Rather, what scared BoA’s board was the Federal Re-
serve’s supervisory power to remove the management of banks.198 
With or without government ownership, the political interference 
that concerned the property rights theorists had been in place.199 
In this sense, the magnitude of additional negative effects that 
government ownership per se could add is doubtful. 
Some empirical studies on the efficiency of government-
owned firms can further support the above observation. In general, 
most empirical studies report that government-owned firms are 
less efficient than their private counterparts.200 Nevertheless, the 
empirical evidence on the performance of government-owned firms 
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in a regulated environment is surprisingly different. For instance, 
Scott E. Atkinson and Robert Halvorsen analyzed the data of 
U.S. electric utilities and found that government-owned and pri-
vate firms were equally cost-inefficient.201 Catherine C. Eckel and 
Theo Vermaelen analyzed data of governmental purchase of stock 
in private Canadian firms and found that private shareholders 
suffered losses from government’s purchase of shares only in un-
regulated industries.202 Eckel and Vermaelen offered two expla-
nations of their findings. One is that a government’s regulation 
through internal direct ownership is less costly than external 
regulation.203 The other is that government ownership might not 
increase agency costs in regulated firms because existing regula-
tions have already incorporated these costs.204 These inferences 
support my above arguments. 
To be sure, government ownership still differs from gov-
ernment regulation and supervision. The extent, however, might 
be limited. The mainstream opinion could exaggerate the negative 
effects associated with government ownership. 
C. Antidotal Institutions in the United States 
Even if some negative effects associated with government 
ownership of banks remain, they are likely to be minimal or con-
trollable in the United States. At least three major U.S. institu-
tions can mitigate the negative effects of government ownership: 
the competitive financial market, developed financial system, and 
advanced political institutions. 
1. The United States Has a Competitive Financial Market 
To begin, the United States possesses a competitive financial 
market. Market competition is always a crucial corporate govern-
ance institution.205 In a competitive financial market, investors 
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and outsiders can easily measure the economic performance of 
government-owned banks. If government bureaucrats in charge 
of government-owned banks are inefficient, the threat of compe-
tition by private counterparts will reveal such inefficiency and force 
them to improve their efficiency. Competition can also constrain 
the politicians and government bureaucrats who operate govern-
ment-owned banks from pursuing their own political agendas or 
personal interest.  
The above inference finds a comparative piece of empirical 
support. Marcia Million Cornett et al. studied the data of East Asian 
banks during and after the East Asian financial crisis and found 
that government-owned banks performed more poorly than private 
banks in 1997 to 2000, but such difference disappeared in 2001–
2004.206 They interpreted this change as consistent with a life-cycle 
model, under which the increasing globalization of financial services 
brought about competition and thus pressured government-owned 
banks to improve their banking policy, which, in turn, enhanced 
the performance of government-owned banks.207 This empirical 
finding suggests that market competition may control govern-
ment inefficiency. 
2. The United States Has a Highly Developed Financial  
System 
The United States also possesses a highly developed fi-
nancial system.208 A highly developed financial system contains 
more readily available financial techniques, experienced talents, 
                                                                                                                         
206 See generally Marcia Million Cornett et al., The Impact of State Ownership 
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208 See generally Herbert L. Baer & Larry R. Mote, The United States Financial 
System, in BANKING STRUCTURES IN MAJOR COUNTRIES 469 (George G. Kaufman 
ed., 1992). 
2019] GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF BANKS 705 
and market rules, which can field the inexperienced government 
bureaucrats necessary to exercise government ownership. It would 
also be easier for government bureaucrats to mimic their private 
counterparts, which reduces the difference in expertise between 
private and government-owned banks.  
This inference also finds a comparative piece of empirical 
support. As mentioned above, La Porta et al. found that government 
ownership of banks caused more adverse effects on economic growth 
in financially underdeveloped countries than in financially de-
veloped countries.209 Tobias Korner and Isabel Schnabel further 
elaborated this point. Their studies, based on a sample of eighty-two 
countries, showed that the impact of government ownership of 
banks on economic growth depended strongly on a country’s degree 
of financial development.210 In highly developed financial systems, 
as measured by a country’s private credits (i.e., the value of credits 
of financial intermediaries to private sectors divided by GDP), 
they did not find any significant effect of government ownership 
on growth.211 At even higher levels of financial development, the 
marginal effect of government ownership even became positive and 
large.212 According to Korner and Schnabel, a well-developed fi-
nancial system possesses existing high financial standards, such as 
ready-made new techniques, well-trained job-market candidates, 
experienced employees, good regulation, prudential supervision, 
and adequate competition.213 These standards can mitigate the 
principal-agent problem within government-owned banks and thus 
benefit these banks.214 
3. The United States Has More Advanced Political Institutions 
Finally, the United States possesses more advanced political 
institutions. One major concern regarding government ownership 
relates to the distrust of government bureaucrats and politicians.215 
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Such concerns can be largely mitigated if a country possesses rela-
tively advanced and transparent legal and political institutions 
that may supervise government bureaucrats and politicians.216 
Even though U.S. society distrusts its politicians,217 this country 
has far more advanced political institutions that are relatively 
transparent and institutionalized, which results in relatively less 
corruption than many other countries.218 With these advanced 
political institutions to hold politicians and bureaucrats accounta-
ble, the U.S. banking sector should be subject to a less negative 
effect associated with government ownership of banks. 
This inference again finds a comparative piece of empirical 
support. Korner and Schnabel also found that the impact of gov-
ernment ownership on economic growth depended on the quality 
of a country’s political institutions and governance structures.219 
In countries with high-quality political institutions, as measured 
by democracy indices, assessments of political rights, governance 
indicators, and corruption indices, government ownership of banks 
does not influence economic growth at all.220 Their explanation 
of this finding is that good political institutions may mitigate the 
agency problem between taxpayers and politicians, which controls 
the abuse of government-owned banks by politicians.221 
To summarize the above, as a well-developed country with 
adequate antidotal institutions, the United States, in fact, possesses 
some born advantages to adopt government ownership of banks. 
Indeed, government ownership of banks may incur some negative 
effects. Nevertheless, many institutions as suggested above may 
alleviate these concerns. Unlike many other developing countries, 
the United States possesses all the necessary mitigation institu-
tions: a competitive financial market, a developed financial system, 
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and advanced legal and political institutions. As a developed coun-
try with these institutions, government ownership of banks per se 
may be less detrimental in the United States. The experience of 
RFC investments and the CIC case, under which the government 
generally refrained from intervening in the firms’ daily operational 
decisions, may also provide some comfort to U.S. society.222 
The above inferences can also find support from a U.S.-
specific empirical study. Stacey R. Kole and J. Harold Mulherin 
conducted an empirical study of APC companies which were 
government-owned during the post–World War II period.223 They 
found that the performance of APC companies was not significantly 
different from that of their private counterparts.224 This finding, 
which is precious considering the rare government ownership 
practice in the United States, shows that government ownership 
in the United States does not necessarily bear the negative effects 
normally attributed to government ownership. 
III. GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP AND BANK GOVERNANCE IN THE  
POST–FINANCIAL CRISIS ERA 
On the other hand, government ownership may have particu-
lar merits in the banking sector considering that it can promote 
sound corporate governance of banks, especially in improving poor 
risk management practices.225 
Corporate governance of banks has a different face from that 
of general firms.226 In the post–Financial Crisis era, bank govern-
ance increasingly emphasizes a robust risk management system 
to protect creditors’ interests as well as the stability of individual 
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banks and the whole financial system. In this Part, I will demon-
strate how government ownership of banks, coupled with the use 
of government directors, can help to build robust risk manage-
ment in banks. 
A. Banks Are Special 
Banks are special for at least five major reasons.227 First, 
banks serve the function of liquidity production by engaging in 
maturity mismatch activities, i.e., borrowing short and lending long; 
this causes their assets to be largely comprised of liabilities as 
opposed to equities.228 Accordingly, unlike general firms where 
shareholders are the ones having the largest interest in the firm, 
in banks, creditors also have considerable stakes, and their interests 
must be duly taken into account.229 The problem of bank runs, 
which erode the liquidity of banks and accelerate their collapse, 
further underscores the importance of maintaining the trust and 
confidence of public creditors in banks.230 
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Second, banks are subject to several types of systemic risks. 
Banks engage in similar activities, which expose them to the risk 
of correlation, that is, the failure of any of those activities could 
simultaneously harm all entities in the financial system.231 In ad-
dition, banks largely engage in business with each other, which 
exposes all of them to the risk of connectedness, meaning the failure 
of one bank could harm all its counterparties and thus spread the 
negative effects of one single failure to the whole financial sys-
tem.232 The risk of connectedness may further evolve into the risk 
of contagion, that is, one single failure may send a strong nega-
tive signal to market participants and cause them to panic.233 They 
may thus withdraw their lending all of a sudden, which results in 
the bank runs problem.234 In sum, any one single failure case can 
shake the stability of the whole financial system. This systemic risk 
concern further leads to the notorious too-big-to-fail problem. 
Third, banks are closely connected with the economic de-
velopment of a society. They play the intermediary role by receiv-
ing the household savings in forms of deposits, mutual funds, 
etc., accumulating them into investment funds and investing them 
in forms of loans or equity. This series of activities ultimately 
transforms household savings into investment in businesses, 
which creates the flow of money and thus promotes economic 
development.235 Through this process, banks also serve the mon-
ey creation function. They create extra money in addition to that 
actually issued by the government, which again promotes eco-
nomic development.236 The collapse of one bank will naturally 
cause negative effects on the flow of money, and the function of 
money creation, and thus harm the economy of a country.237 Ac-
cordingly, banks not only create profits for their investors but also 
play a public role.238 
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Fourth, banks are notoriously opaque in terms of their bal-
ance sheets, quality of loans, etc. This opaqueness can be attributed 
to several factors. For instance, the activities of banks, such as 
loans, derivatives, securitizations, etc., are relatively too compli-
cated for outsiders to assess the quality of these activities.239 
The multilayer organizational structure within a banking con-
glomerate, especially a multinational one, also makes it more 
challenging for the central decision body to integrate necessary 
information to make a comprehensive judgment.240 The opaqueness 
of banks makes it difficult for bank insiders to understand the 
real status of that bank, as well as for outside investors, stake-
holders, and regulators to monitor that bank.241 
Finally, banks are heavily regulated, which creates unique 
governance issues. For instance, the deposit insurance mechanism 
creates the well-known moral hazard problem, under which de-
positors have little incentive to monitor banks.242 Capital ade-
quacy requirements also provide incentives for shareholders to 
undertake excessive risks because higher capital requirements 
cause shareholders to ask for higher investment premiums.243 This 
induces management to take a riskier business strategy to satisfy 
the needs of shareholders.244 In sum, while banking regulations 
and supervisions address some problems unique to banks, they 
also create new challenges to the corporate governance of banks. 
B. Pictures of Bank Governance 
The special characteristics of banks mentioned above imply 
that their corporate governance should differ from that of general 
firms.245 One major difference is that bank governance should 
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place greater emphasis on the creditors’ interests; creditors are a 
crucial group of stakeholders due to the high leverage of banks.246 
The agency conflict between creditors and shareholders is espe-
cially severe.247 Nevertheless, the vehicles available for address-
ing creditors’ interests are limited. 
Shareholders will hardly consider interests other than their 
own; protected by limited liability, they pursue more risks than 
creditors.248 Therefore, entrusting the supervision of banks to 
shareholders cannot adequately incentivize management to con-
sider the risk control of banks. Quite the opposite, it may induce the 
management to pursue a profit-seeking and risk-pursuing direc-
tion. 249  Without adequate risk-control incentive, empowering 
shareholders could ultimately endanger the survival of individ-
ual banks as well as the whole financial system and economy.250 
Creditors, who have substantial stakes in banks, can hardly 
monitor as well. For one thing, most creditors of banks are the 
diffused public, which has neither the ability nor the incentive to 
monitor banks.251 Deposit insurance further introduces the moral 
hazard problem to creditors and thus weakens their incentive to 
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monitor the management of banks.252 The ceiling amount of in-
surance under deposit insurance further poses obstacles to intro-
ducing large-sum concentrated creditors in banks.253 These all 
weaken the creditor governance of banks, which, in turn, encour-
ages managements to increase risk-taking in banks to honor 
shareholders’ interests. 
Given the inherent defects of shareholders and creditors, 
the best practice of bank governance entrusts the mission to the 
board of directors. The Basel Committee issued eight principles for 
bank governance in 1999 and updated them in 2006.254 These prin-
ciples highlighted the role of the board of directors in bank gov-
ernance.255 Such emphases also obtained some recognition in the 
United States. Jonathan R. Macey and Maureen O’Hara, for in-
stance, suggested that bank directors should “take solvency risk 
explicitly and systematically into account when making deci-
sions.”256 They further argued that the bank directors should owe 
duties and obligations to creditors as well, instead of exclusively 
to shareholders.257 These all highlight the central role of the board 
of directors in bank governance. 
C. Dilemma of Bank Governance After the Financial Crisis 
The Financial Crisis ruthlessly exposed the deficiency of 
the current practices of bank governance as well as many other 
problems of banking regulation and supervision.258 While some 
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commentators argued that failures of bank governance had little 
or even no relevance to the outbreak of the Financial Crisis,259 
the majority opinion, both on international levels (such as in the 
OECD260 and the Basel Committee261), and on regional levels (such 
as in the United States,262 European Union263 and the United 
Kingdom264), maintained that failures of bank governance accel-
erated and aggravated the Financial Crisis.265 
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1. Risk Management and Control 
The failure of banks to manage their risks is a major prob-
lem revealed by the Financial Crisis.266 A number of banks either 
failed to identify the risks or sought to explain them away to 
justify the risks.267 Due to their multilevel organizational struc-
tures, many banks even failed to pass their risks to the ultimate 
decision level for consideration.268 A notorious example is that many 
banks engaged in the subprime mortgage market and derivatives 
such as collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) without fully com-
prehending the incurred risks and how these risks would influ-
ence their own financial status.269 This is a major reason why 
the Financial Crisis expanded in such a fast and broad manner. 
The counter-argument claims that the above observations 
are simply hindsight narratives. It argues that virtually all par-
ticipants in the financial system failed to foresee the crisis; there-
fore, we should not blame banks for their failure to manage these 
unexpected risks.270 Nevertheless, the spirit of risk management 
lies not only in foreseeing the unexpected risks, but also in being 
well-prepared to reduce losses to the minimum once any unex-
pected risks occur. Before the Financial Crisis, most banks appar-
ently ignored the importance of equipping themselves to sustain 
unexpected risks. As the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission speci-
fied, before the Financial Crisis, the five major investment banks—
Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, 
and Morgan Stanley—were operating with extraordinarily thin 
capital, which was less than 2.5 percent of the leverage ratio.271 
This means that a 2.5 percent drop in asset value could make them 
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insolvent.272 The Commission also pointed out that they relied 
too much on “short-term [borrowing] in the overnight market.”273 
This shows that they were just too ignorant of the importance of 
risk management. 
2. Board Capacity and Practices 
Following the lack of adequate risk management, another 
problem relates to the capacity of banks’ decision-makers to act as 
gatekeepers. Preventing banks from taking excessive risks requires 
not only a system of risk management but also having the right per-
sons there. Good bank governance shall emphasize “expertise” more 
than “independence,” or at least place them on an equal footing.274 
Many directors and senior managers of banks, however, did not 
possess sufficient expertise, experience, and knowledge to conduct 
proper risk management.275 Another key lesson from the Finan-
cial Crisis is that, in practice, bank directors tend to take false 
comfort from their regulatory capital ratios—they failed to inquire 
further into the risk profile of the banks once they found compli-
ance with regulatory requirements.276 
3. Compensation Regime 
Compensation regimes are another aspect of corporate gov-
ernance that attracted focus during the Financial Crisis. Many 
commentators believed that equity-based pay caused directors and 
                                                                                                                         
272 Id. at xix. 
273 Id. 
274  2009 OECD KEY FINDINGS, supra note 245, at 44–46; 2010 OECD 
CONCLUSIONS, supra note 260, at 19–21; Hopt, supra note 226, at 362; Kirkpatrick, 
supra note 265, at 81–82; Mulbert, supra note 227, at 29–30. Some commentators 
even point the fingers at the widespread imposition of independent director re-
quirements in financial sectors, which caused directors on the boards of finan-
cial institutions to have limited professions and experience. See Adams, supra note 
259, at 34; Renee B. Adams & Hamid Mehran, Bank Board Structure and Perfor-
mance: Evidence for Large Bank Holding Companies, 21 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 
243, 249 (2012); Kirkpatrick, supra note 265, at 81–82. 
275 Kirkpatrick, supra note 265, at 62. 
276 2009 OECD KEY FINDINGS, supra note 245, at 31; Brian R. Cheffins, 
The Corporate Governance Movement, Banks and the Financial Crisis, 16 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1, 40 (2015); Mulbert, supra note 227, at 37. 
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managers to place greater emphasis on shareholders’ interests, re-
sulting in greater risk-taking by banks and leading to the Financial 
Crisis.277 Specifically, the compensation design before the Financial 
Crisis aligned the interests of directors and management of banks 
too much with the firms’ short-term stock performance. This created 
incentives for directors and management to undertake myopic 
and risky activities to boost short-term stock performance at the 
risk of the stability and survival of banks.278 Without reshaping 
such compensation regimes, banks can hardly have people on the 
board with the right incentive to conduct proper risk management 
even though they are capable of doing so.279 
4. Reform and Dilemma: How to Create a Robust Board of 
Directors? 
a. Better Regulation Is Needed, but Not Enough 
After the Financial Crisis, reformers proposed a number of 
ways to enhance the risk control of banks. One straightforward 
way is to promulgate a complete set of banking regulations to im-
pose stricter requirements on banks. For instance, the Basel Com-
mittee adopted the Basel III standards in 2010, which significantly 
raised the capital requirement, added the leverage ratio require-
ment, and adopted measures of liquidity risks.280 
While enhanced banking regulation and supervision is defi-
nitely needed and helpful for preventing another crisis, they are not 
capable of resolving all the associated concerns. This is because 
they merely set a minimum requirement for banks to observe but 
satisfying these requirements does not guarantee that banks will be 
free from any risks. 
                                                                                                                         
277 See, e.g., 2009 OECD KEY FINDINGS, supra note 245, at 14–30, 40; 2011 
REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE U.S., supra note 258, at xix; Bruner, 
supra note 186, at 316–17; Hopt, supra note 226, at 367; Kirkpatrick, supra 
note 265, at 72–73. 
278 2011 REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE U.S., supra note 258, at xix. 
279 For related proposals to reform bankers’ pay, see, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk 
& Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249 (2010). 
280 See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A 
GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING 
SYSTEMS (2010) [hereinafter BASEL III]. For a summary of key changes under 
Basel III, see SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 2, at 607–31. 
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For one thing, banking regulations are doomed to be incom-
plete. The financial world is so complicated and ever-changing, and 
the innovation of financial products and financial techniques are 
so rapid. Banking regulations can hardly catch up with them im-
mediately. Even though the regulator can amend banking regu-
lations from time to time after it finds the deficiency of the current 
laws, the amendment itself needs time, which inevitably leaves 
a significant window period. The evolution of Basel capital re-
quirements provides a vivid example. Before the Financial Cri-
sis, Basel II had largely revised Basel I, introducing a far more 
detailed set of capital requirements to address credit risks of 
banks.281 Nevertheless, the Financial Crisis made us realize that 
Basel II was just not enough. Basel II simply ignored the liquidity 
risk, which was a major cause of the Financial Crisis.282 Therefore, 
Basel III adopted the liquidity coverage requirements and net 
stable funding ratios to resolve this deficiency.283 This experi-
ence taught us a lesson: we can hardly be sure that the current 
banking regulations and standards have exhausted all possible 
categories of risks. 
Moreover, it is nearly impossible to come up with one-size-
fits-all banking regulations. Each bank has its own risk profile. 
For instance, the regulator can certainly promulgate a rule pro-
hibiting any banks from extending loans to a single borrower 
above a specified numerical limit. Nevertheless, it does not guar-
antee that banks would not suffer serious harms as long as it 
observes this limit. Banks still need to consider, in each specific 
case, the identity, financial conditions, and credit record of this 
borrower, the quality of its collateral, the bank’s own financial 
conditions, and loans profile, and so on. There are too many fac-
tors to consider on a case-by-case basis. No benevolent regulator 
can possibly enact regulations to prescribe for all these details. 
Even if it is possible, the regulatory cost would be unimaginably 
enormous, which makes it impracticable. 
To be sure, I do not intend to argue that improving bank-
ing regulation and supervision is futile. They are always the 
                                                                                                                         
281 BASEL II COMMITTEE ON BANK SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE 
OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK 
COMPREHENSIVE VERSION i–ii, ¶ 11 (2004) [hereinafter BASEL II]. 
282 BASEL III, supra note 280, ¶¶ 34–36. 
283 Id. ¶¶ 40–42. 
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main tool to control misbehaviors and associated risks of banks. 
The point is that banking regulations and supervisions have their 
own limits. As mentioned above, one key lesson from the Finan-
cial Crisis was that bank directors took too much comfort from their 
compliance with regulatory requirements without inquiring further 
into the risk profile of the banks.284 In light of that, improving 
bank governance is still warranted. In a sense, bank governance 
and banking regulation are complementary with each other in 
functional terms.285 
b. Better Governance Is Needed but How Can It Be 
Achieved? 
Reforms resulting from the failure of bank governance dur-
ing the Financial Crisis stress the importance of a robust risk 
management system.286 Nevertheless, a well-functioning bank 
governance system depends on the quality of people.287 Rules and 
principles of best practices are all in the book, but it is the people 
who give them life. The problem thus rests not only on how to con-
duct risk management but also on whom to entrust to conduct it. 
Related reforms again stress the important role of the 
board of directors.288 OECD made it clear that “oversight of risk 
                                                                                                                         
284 2009 OECD KEY FINDINGS, supra note 245, at 31; Mulbert, supra note 
227, at 37. 
285 Mulbert, supra note 227, at 25–26; see also Renee Adams & Hamid Mehran, 
Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies, 9 ECON. POL’Y 
REV. 123, 123 (2003); Cheffins, supra note 276, at 2, 11, 37; Heremans & Bosquet, 
supra note 247, at 1568; Dirk Heremans, Corporate Governance Issues for Banks: 
A Financial Stability Perspective 8–9 (Center for Econ. Stud., Discussion Paper 
Series No. 07.07, Feb. 2007). 
286 2009 OECD KEY FINDINGS, supra note 245, at 31. 
287 Hopt, supra note 226, at 368. 
288 As a side note, the reform of general corporate governance, as opposed to 
bank governance, appears to focus on enhancing shareholder empowerment. For 
instance, the Dodd-Frank Act passed several legal designs to enhance the share-
holders’ say on corporate decisions, such as non-binding shareholder vote to 
approve executive compensation (“say on pay”), enhanced disclosure regarding 
the executive compensation and financial performance of the issuer, three-year 
clawback of incentive-based pay following accounting restatements, the SEC’s 
authority to expand proxy access, etc. Bruner, supra note 186, at 320. While 
shareholder empowerment undeniably has some merits in better preventing 
managers from failing to pursue shareholders’ interests, it can hardly resolve the 
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management is a clear duty of the board” and “it is considered good 
practice that the Board is responsible for both establishing and 
overseeing the company’s enterprise-wide, risk management system 
and ensuring that it is compatible with its strategy and risk appe-
tite.”289 “Particularly in financial institutions, a separate channel of 
risk reporting to the board such as via a chief risk officer is war-
ranted in the same way as internal audit reports separately to the 
audit committee and not just to the CEO.”290 In its revised prin-
ciples for corporate governance of banks, the Basel Committee also 
reiterated that “the board has overall responsibility for the bank, 
including approving and overseeing the implementation of the 
bank’s strategic objectives, risk strategy, corporate governance and 
corporate values.”291 Grant Kirkpatrick made it clear that “qualified 
board oversight and robust risk management is important.”292 Klaus 
J. Hopt also held a similar position, stating that “the problem is 
rather enforcement” and stressed the importance of strengthen-
ing supervisory requirements such as establishing a separate risk 
committee and independent Chief Risk Officer (“CRO”) as well as 
having qualified and experienced board members; “[i]n the end, 
everything depends on the people.”293 
The board of directors ought to be the central focus, but its 
poor performance during the Financial Crisis, as mentioned above, 
exposed its inherent deficiency.294 As revealed in the Financial 
                                                                                                                         
real problem, i.e., the protection of creditors’ interests as well as other public 
interests. According to Bruner, the reason for such movement could be because 
“our corporate governance system largely revolves around two powerful con-
stituencies, the board and the shareholders. Thus, to the degree the crisis was 
caused by board oversight failures, the answer must be more shareholder[s’] 
monitoring of boards themselves.” Id. at 321. This simple dichotomy, however, 
does not really scratch where it itches. See id. 
289 2010 OECD CONCLUSIONS, supra note 260, at 14–15 (emphasis added). 
290 2009 OECD KEY FINDINGS, supra note 245, at 40 (emphasis added). 
OECD also made it clear that “[t]he board bears primary responsibility for 
strategy and for associated risk management.” Id. “Boards must therefore 
monitor the structure of the company and its culture and also ensure a reli-
able and relevant flow of information (the assurance perspective) to the board 
about the implementation of its strategy and the associated risks.” Id. 
291 BASEL 2010 PRINCIPLES, supra note 261, at 7 (emphasis added); BASEL 
2015 PRINCIPLES, supra note 261, at 8 (emphasis added). 
292 Kirkpatrick, supra note 265, at 62 (emphasis added). 
293 Hopt, supra note 226, at 367–68 (emphasis added). 
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Crisis, business directors may lack adequate expertise and expe-
rience to comprehend the risk profile of the bank and conduct 
meaningful risk management accordingly.295 Even if they have 
the knowledge and capacity, they may have insufficient incentive 
to pay attention to such risks.296 This is because their profit-seeking 
mindset, together with the profit-based compensation scheme, may 
induce them to undertake and justify risks rather than control 
risks.297 In the end, banks’ boards of directors might lack neces-
sary capacity and incentive to duly conduct risk management.298 
The board of directors remains the key to robust bank 
governance and risk management in a post–Financial Crisis era. 
The central problem now is how to find the right people with the 
right incentive, expertise, and experience to sit on the board. 
D. Can Government Directors Supplement Business Directors? 
To have the right people sit on the board, the core question 
is: which entity is best suited to select the right people? I propose 
that, when the private ordering fails, the government may well be 
                                                                                                                         
295 Id. at 362–63. 
296 Id. at 349. 
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298 One intuitive proposal to address this dilemma is to strengthen board 
independence, such as increasing the portion of independent directors on the board 
of banks. This might not scratch where it itches. The independence requirement, 
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systemic evidence demonstrating that independent directors will enhance firm 
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tured by management, but independence itself has nothing to do with enhanced 
capacity and incentive of board members to perform risk management for banks. 
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board does not appear to be a convincing solution. See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra 
note 2, at 178–83; Kirkpatrick, supra note 265, at 81–82; Hopt, supra note 226, 
at 362. For studies finding no positive correlation between board independence 
and firm performance, see, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-
correlation between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. 
CORP. L. 231, 233–34 (2001); Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate 
Governance and Firm Operating Performance, 32 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & 
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that entity.299 Government ownership of banks facilitates the gov-
ernment’s appointment of government directors to banks’ boards 
and thus the government’s new role.300 
1. Better Protection of Creditors 
To begin with, government owners and their appointed gov-
ernment directors may better represent creditors’ interests on 
the boards of banks than shareholder-elected directors. As men-
tioned above, corporate creditors are as crucial as shareholders 
in capitalizing banks.301 Government directors can better repre-
sent creditors’ interests on the board because the regulator’s inter-
ests are closely aligned with those of creditors.302 They both prefer 
a less risky bank: creditors prefer their debts repaid and the regula-
tors prefer a stable financial system.303 Deposit insurance also 
renders the regulator the ultimate creditor of insured banks and 
further aligns the government’s interest with creditors.304 Ac-
cordingly, the government is better motivated to implement risk 
management systems within banks and thus protect creditors’ 
interest. This common objective of creditors and the regulator is 
exactly what is missing in the current board practice. Government 
directors can supplement this missing piece by bringing more ro-
bust risk management and balancing banks’ profits against risk 
control. As a consequence of enhanced creditor protection, gov-
ernment directors also stabilize individual banks, as well as the 
entire financial system.305 
To be sure, I do not intend to assert that shareholders’ in-
terests should be subordinated to creditors’ interests. The primary 
objective of banks remains to maximize firms’ value. The role of 
government directors on the board is simply to ensure that banks 
do not pursue profits at the expense of creditors. 
                                                                                                                         
299 For the literature favoring this idea, see Black, supra note 12, at 594–
95; Mulbert, supra note 227, at 20. For the literature disfavoring this idea, see 
Hopt, supra note 226, at 353–54. 
300 Black, supra note 12, at 594–95. 
301 Mulbert, supra note 227, at 10. 
302 Id. at 25–26. 
303 Bruner, supra note 186, at 312. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. at 317. 
722 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:667 
2. Supplement Incomplete Banking Regulation and Supervision 
In addition, government directors can be a useful tool for 
the banking regulator to implement regulatory policies within 
banks. Banking regulations are inevitably incomplete due to the 
complexity and ever-changing nature of the financial world. While 
amending or supplementing problematic banking regulations is 
feasible, in reality, it is always one pace behind the pace of rapid 
financial innovation.306 In addition, each bank has its own risk pro-
file, and banking regulations can only impose minimal require-
ments, not optimal requirements. Therefore, simply vesting the 
regulators with rulemaking and supervision authority might not 
be able to address all problems in advance and in time. Banking 
regulation and supervision just have their limits. 
To address such limits, the regulator can perhaps prom-
ulgate a general rule in advance with abstract standards while 
authorizing the regulator to implement it through its discretion 
on a case-by-case basis. Basel II partly adopted this approach: its 
internal-ratings-based approach applicable to sophisticated banks 
does not stipulate specific numerical capital requirements.307 In-
stead, it merely specifies several factors for each bank’s consid-
eration.308 Banks may conduct their own internal estimates of 
risk components to determine their own capital requirements.309 
To prevent sophisticated banks from abusing their discretion, this 
approach also vests the banking regulator with wide supervisory 
power, which largely relies on the regulator to supervise the reason-
ableness and appropriateness of each bank’s own model.310 In this 
way, it is the banking regulator’s ex post supervision of each indi-
vidual bank that guards the safety and soundness of banks, ra-
ther than the ex ante banking regulation.311 Undeniably, this ex 
post regulatory approach may be more feasible than promulgat-
ing complete banking regulations. Nevertheless, this approach 
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involves intensive governmental supervision and inevitably con-
tains considerable regulatory costs.312 
In contrast to regulators, government directors can be more 
efficient. Government directors can monitor and reflect the regu-
lator’s concerns on a case-by-case basis, which may supplement the 
banking regulation and supervision. Specifically, government direc-
tors could implement regulatory policies based on the risk profile 
of each bank without promulgating a complete set of banking regu-
lations to address all the details. This saves the regulatory cost. 
Another benefit is that government directors do not need to be 
restricted to government officials. The regulator may retain other 
private professionals in law, accounting, or finance, such as pro-
fessors, lawyers, accountants, bankers, or retired managers, to serve 
as government directors. This reduces the staffing problem. Moreo-
ver, as these representatives are directors of banks, their fees 
would be paid by banks instead of the government budget, which 
saves the government budget as well. In this sense, government 
directors may be another option that supplements the incom-
plete banking regulation and supervision. 
3. The Regulator’s Better Access to Information 
An additional benefit of employing government directors 
is that they can facilitate the regulator’s information gathering. 
The opaqueness of banks creates informational asymmetries that 
plague the regulator’s regulation and supervision.313 By having 
government directors on the board, the regulator can obtain more 
internal information not easily accessible to outside regulators. 
This facilitates banking regulation and supervision in several 
ways. First, government directors may serve as an early warning 
system, allowing the regulator to receive information about the 
status of specific banks more immediately and accurately. Second, 
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government directors may also reduce the information cost be-
tween the regulator and the regulated firms; the regulator can 
thus obtain more knowledge and know-how in banking indus-
tries for designing banking regulations that are more suitable to 
sectoral needs. Finally, these government directors can accumu-
late considerable knowledge, experience, and expertise related to 
banking sectors, and may become more reliable talents for the 
regulator in the future. Some directors may even become candi-
dates for the chief of regulatory agencies. 
To be sure, the regulator can also obtain access to internal 
information of banks by requiring them to provide information 
periodically to the regulator. In fact, the U.S. regulator already has 
such power.314 The regulator can even promulgate a rule which 
requires all banks to provide all board meeting materials to the 
regulator so that the regulator can obtain information equally with 
a board member of banks without sitting on the board. Never-
theless, there remain some differences between this regulatory 
approach vis-à-vis a directorship approach. For one thing, gov-
ernment directors cannot only access the information but also 
influence banks’ decisions. Accordingly, the regulator’s authority 
to request information from banks cannot fully replace government 
directorship of banks. Moreover, as a regulator, the government 
seeks information for the regulatory purpose. Therefore, the gov-
ernment’s request of information needs a regulatory justification. 
Outside this scope, the government, as a regulator, is less justi-
fied to ask for information. In contrast, as a board member, the 
government may have more justified access to corporate infor-
mation, which extends to all business-related information, because 
a director does not need to restrict his/her concern to regulatory 
matters. Therefore, government directors can request more in-
formation for consideration. This is of merit particularly when 
the banking regulation is incomplete so that the regulator has 
less legal ground to ask for information.315 
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for precautionary purposes. 
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E. Summary 
To conclude, I argue that government ownership of banks, 
accompanied with the use of government directors, can facilitate 
a robust bank governance system. A major concern against this 
argument could be that government directors may implicate dra-
matic political influences and shift the government’s focus from 
regulatory concern to political self-interest.316 In most jurisdictions, 
this concern could be true. Nevertheless, as illustrated in Part III of 
this Article, comparatively speaking, the United States can be opti-
mistic thanks to its more competitive financial market, more ad-
vanced financial system, and more well-developed political and 
legal institutions. 
My argument finds support from the study of Svetlana 
Andrianova et al.317 Based on similar samples as those employed 
by La Porta et al., they found that, after controlling two addi-
tional institutional factors, i.e., index measuring bureaucratic 
quality and its insulation from political intervention and index 
of property rights, government ownership of banks was in fact 
positively associated with long-run economic growth.318  Their 
explanation of this result is that government ownership of banks 
may alleviate the “extreme, yet real, threat to the growth pro-
moting role of banks” posed by the extreme yet unchecked moral 
hazard behavior of opportunistic bank insiders. 319  Based on 
these findings, Andrianova et al. believe that “even in the 21st 
century, government owned banks can continue to play a ‘devel-
opmental’ role, not only in developing but also in industrialized 
countries by constraining extreme moral hazard behaviors that 
have a capacity to undermine long term economic growth.”320 
This finding supports my argument that government ownership 
and directorship of banks could enhance bank governance and 
risk management. 
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IV. A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF 
BANKS IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. The United States Should Be More Positive 
To be sure, I do not propose a general application of govern-
ment ownership or directorship to all banks. It could be too costly 
for the U.S. government to purchase shares of all banks. Besides, 
even though it is technically feasible to promulgate statutes or regu-
lations authorizing the regulator to appoint government directors 
on the board of all banks, this approach would prove impossible 
for political reasons. Furthermore, the regulator would find it 
difficult to recruit an adequate number of government directors 
for all banks. Therefore, a general application of this reform to 
all banks is not a feasible option. 
I do, however, believe that the U.S. banking sector should 
hold a more positive view toward government ownership of banks. 
As I argued, the United States has the position to be more opti-
mistic of government ownership than other countries. This posi-
tive attitude may allow the U.S. government to be less hesitant 
when it needs to hold ownership of banks for policy reasons, such 
as bailouts. 
A step further, government ownership and directorship 
should at least remain an option for complementing banking regu-
lation and supervision. The U.S. banking regulator could consider 
a regime, under which it appoints a small number of government 
directors to sit on the board of a specific bank when that bank 
fails to perform its risk management appropriately. For instance, 
where a bank significantly or repetitively fails the stress test, falls 
below a specific capital requirement threshold, fails the liquidity 
requirement, encounters serious internal control deficiencies, 
breaches laws, etc., these instances could be understood as signals 
demonstrating the unqualified corporate governance and risk 
management of that bank. In these cases, the government may 
not want to hesitate to step in anymore; otherwise, risks could be 
further exposed and expanded. Specifically, when a bank goes 
insolvent and requires the equity bailout from the government, 
it suggests the risk management failure of this bank, which 
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should justify the government’s ownership and directorship of 
that bank.321 
This alternative approach harmonizes with the prevalent 
resistance to government ownership and directorship. It leaves 
the task of corporate governance and risk management to the 
private sector in the first place. As long as the private sector can 
perform well on its own initiative, the regulator need not insist 
on intervening. If, however, there is a sign that business direc-
tors are unable to prevent excessive risk-taking, they may have 
less legitimate excuses to refuse the government’s intervention. 
In such cases, government ownership and directorship may find 
more justification and thus absorb more resistance. Besides, such 
government ownership and directorship of banks need not be on 
a permanent basis. The regulator can set a specific period for the 
mandatory government representation and, on expiration, reas-
sess whether it is necessary to extend this period.322 
B.  Some Practical Considerations 
Plenty of literature has discussed how to design a regula-
tory structure for future bailouts, in particular in respect of how 
to institutionalize government bailouts323 and how to address the 
potential conflict of interest.324 In addition to these proposals, I 
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add some more practical considerations in case the U.S. government 
needs to hold ownership or directorship of banks in the future. 
1. Source of Talents 
The first question relates to “whom” the government should 
appoint to the board of banks. Black and Jordan, representing the 
minority opinion supporting government ownership, proposed that 
the government should appoint its public officials to serve as gov-
ernment directors.325 A concern related to this proposal is a prob-
lem of quality. The U.S. government officials may lack sufficient 
experience in business sectors due to the government’s long self-
constraint from involving itself in corporate operations.326 They 
may not have adequate capacity to make sound business deci-
sions for banks.327 
A more desirable approach is to reach out to professionals 
outside the governmental system. The government could estab-
lish a database of “professional directors,”328 including, in addition 
to governmental officials, professionals in law, finance, or account-
ing, such as professors, researchers, lawyers, accountants, invest-
ment bankers, former bank officers, and so on. The idea is to 
retain the “professionals” with either the street smarts or school 
smarts, who comprehend the necessary expertise or possess ex-
perience in the banking sector and can appreciate the importance of 
risk management in banks. 
                                                                                                                         
and Ethics when Government Pays the Tab, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 131, 155–
59 (2009). 
325 Black, supra note 12, at 594; Jordan, supra note 165, at 17–18. 
326 See Jon D. Michaels, Book Review, Running Government Like a Busi-
ness ... Then and Now, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1152, 1164 (2015). 
327 Id. 
328 The idea of “professional directors” was firstly proposed by Ronald J. 
Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, but they introduce this concept in a different 
context. What they contemplate is having institutional investors establish an 
organized clearinghouse, or other intermediaries, which set up a database of 
professionals to be nominated to the boards of companies. See Ronald J. Gilson & 
Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institu-
tional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 881 (1991). In contrast, what I propose 
here is that the government would be the “intermediary” that establishes such a 
database and appoints proper talents to be board members of banks. 
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After the appointment, the regulator and these representa-
tives should regularly communicate with each other on regulatory 
policy concerns and exchange necessary information. The stationed 
bank should pay these government directors from its own pocket 
in accordance with its compensation standard. There might be a 
concern that the stationed bank would thus capture these govern-
ment directors. With the government’s supervision, particularly 
its appointment and dismissal power, however, such capture should 
be less of a problem. 
2. Minority Ownership and Directorship Structure 
To reduce the negative effects of government ownership of 
banks, the government should take as minority of a position on 
the board of banks as possible (except in extreme cases, e.g., where 
there is a strong need to inject large capital into a specific finan-
cial institution, such as that in the AIG case).329 This minority 
model aims to build in a mechanism which represents creditors’ 
interests and risk management so as to facilitate the board to 
make a safer and sounder judgment. Since the government does not 
take majority control of the board, it cannot unilaterally dominate 
management appointment or corporate decisions. Rather, its role 
is to echo the risk concern and supervise the majority members 
in order to pull back business directors from over-pursuing short-
term profits without regard to the risks undertaken by banks. 
The final word is still subject to the collective decision of the 
board, not dominated by government minority directors. By act-
ing as a supervisor rather than a controller, this model can sub-
tly mitigate the negative concerns associated with government 
ownership and directorship. 
Undeniably, the fact that the regulator backs these direc-
tors may trigger some regulatory and political implications. This 
inevitably makes their “minority” voice louder in the boardroom. 
Therefore, laws should restrict actions of government directors 
                                                                                                                         
329 Manns also holds a similar position by proposing that government in-
vestments should be limited to 50 percent of the equity value of any recipient in 
order to avoid excessive entanglement of the government in the private sector. 
Manns, supra note 8, at 1386–87. Cf. Verret, The Bailout Through a Public Choice 
Lens, supra note 7, at 1566–78 (proposing to use the trust structure to prevent 
political intervention). 
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to those related to risk management of banks. I will discuss this 
in the following Section. 
3. Role and Duty of Government Directors 
In terms of the role of government directors, I propose that 
they should be actively involved in the risk management of banks. 
The goal of government directors is to improve risk management 
to protect creditors’ interests, the stability of the individual bank, 
and the whole financial system. Accordingly, unlike the APC prac-
tices, where the government adopted a hands-off approach and 
took intervention only in transactions not in the normal course 
of business,330 government directors here should be more active 
in the corporate affairs bearing on risk management of banks.331 
The fiduciary duty of these government directors should 
be generally similar to ordinary business directors. Even though 
government directors would focus more on the stability and sur-
vival of banks and less on shareholders, this is not inconsistent 
with the prevalent shareholder primacy view—that shareholders’ 
interest should be the primary concern of directors.332 Shareholders 
remain the residual claimants of banks; thus, when government 
directors pursue the stability and survival of banks without di-
verting firm value for other purposes, they also benefit share-
holders. Undeniably, sometimes shareholders favor short-term 
interests at the cost of stability and survival of banks, such as 
some excessively risky investments.333 In such cases, however, 
                                                                                                                         
330 Kole & Mulherin, supra note 74, at 9. 
331 Manns further proposed that the government should make corporate 
governance and systemic risk reform a condition of bailouts up front. Manns, 
supra note 8, at 1391–92. 
332 For the content and rationale of shareholder primacy, see, e.g., FRANK 
H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW 35–39 (1992); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 576–79 
(2014); American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constitu-
ency Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253, 2268–70 (1990); 
John Armour et al., What is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE 
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 28 (Reinier Kraakman et 
al. eds., 3d ed., 2017); Ryan J. York, Visages of Janus: The Heavy Burden of Other 
Constituency Anti-takeover Statutes on Shareholders and the Efficient Market 
for Corporate Control, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 187, 197–98 (2002). 
333 York, supra note 332, at 203. 
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several Delaware court decisions have suggested that directors 
may take into account the interest of the corporation itself to the 
extent that the corporation’s interest differs from that of share-
holders’.334 Accordingly, as long as government directors pursue 
the stability and survival of banks, even though their risk-adverse 
attitude could reduce shareholders’ immediate profit (such as the 
risk premium associated with such risk-taking behaviors), the 
business judgment rule protects their decision.335 
On the other hand, what government directors should not 
pursue are those social objectives unrelated to the stability of banks 
and the financial system. The mission of government directors 
should be as simple as possible. Involving other social objectives 
could incur too much complexity and therefore leave leeway for 
politicians to exercise their political influence.336 Vivid examples 
having bearing here are the government corporations of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac as mentioned above. The government ex-
ercised its leverage in these GSEs to pursue its housing policy, 
which was arguably a socially beneficial policy yet unrelated to 
                                                                                                                         
334 See Eric J. Gouvin, Resolving the Subsidiary Director’s Dilemma, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 287, 297 (1996) (arguing that Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum 
Co. and Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc. “support the discretion 
of directors under the business judgment rule to make the best decision for the 
corporation, even if the shareholders would have preferred other action”); Robert 
A. McCormick, Union Representatives as Corporate Directors: The Challenge to 
the Adversarial Model of Labor Relations, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 219, 247 n.132 
(1982) (arguing that “a majority of courts will not void a board decision that is 
fair and reasonable to the corporation, merely because a director with an outside 
interest participated in making the decision” and citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 
U.S. 295, 306 (1939), Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 
66 (Cal. App. 1952), and Fill Bldgs. Inc. v. Alexander Hamilton Life Ins. Co., 
241 N.W.2d 466 (Mich. 1976), as examples.); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. 
Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters can a Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions 
Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 765 (2008). 
335 McCormick, supra note 334, at 247. 
336 Nicholas O. Kennedy, for instance, advocated an expansive view of cor-
porate purpose, which makes fiduciary duties imposed on the government control-
ling shareholder unnecessary. See Nicholas O. Kennedy, Citizens or Shareholders?: 
Analyzing the Federal Government’s Fiduciary Duties as a Controlling Share-
holder in Corporations Receiving Funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program, 
12 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 21, 56 (2011). Under this view, however, there is a real 
concern that the United States would lose an important tool for controlling 
government shareholder’s and directors’ behaviors. 
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their financial stability.337 It turned out that the whole financial 
system paid for the government’s intervention for such unrelated 
purposes.338  Accordingly, the mission of government directors 
should be simply balancing creditors’ interests and the stability 
and survival of their stationed banks with shareholders’ interests, 
without regard to other social objectives.339 
4. Access to Fiduciary Claims Against Government Directors 
Aside from the substance of the fiduciary duty of government 
directors as discussed above, there could be a procedural concern 
about whether government directors bear fiduciary duties. This 
issue arises from the sovereign immunity doctrine.340 
The sovereign immunity doctrine provides that the sovereign 
(i.e., the federal government) cannot be sued unless it allows itself 
to be.341 Under this doctrine, procedurally, plaintiffs can bring a 
claim against the federal government only in federal court.342 
Substantively, they cannot bring such claims unless the claims fall 
within the waivers of sovereign immunity, i.e., the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, the Tucker Act, or the Administrative Procedure Act.343 
Where an officer’s or agent’s conduct incurs personal liability, 
relief against that person would normally be considered as relief 
                                                                                                                         
337 Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, 
supra note 12, at 1305–06. 
338 Id. 
339 On the other hand, I do not suggest that all banks cannot voluntarily 
engage in activities of social welfare. My proposal simply wishes to set a limit 
to government directors’ actions in order to mitigate the concerns of political 
influence. It is another story if it is the business directors, rather than the gov-
ernment directors, who initiate such social activities. Plenty of literature has 
argued that with or without regard to the interest of a corporation, a corpora-
tion is entitled to engage in public welfare activities. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, 
Sacrificing Corporate Profit in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 763 
(2005); Rhee, supra note 196, at 662. 
340 For a discussion of the fiduciary duty of government directors, other di-
rectors as well as the government controlling shareholders, see generally Barnes, 
supra note 125, at 1445–66; Kahan & Rock, Implications for Delaware, supra 
note 12, at 418–26; Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 333–40. 
341 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1982). 
342 Id. 
343 See Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, 
supra note 12, at 1325–46; Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 307–13. 
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against the sovereign if the decree would “operate against the [sov-
ereign].”344 This, in turn, forbids a court from taking jurisdiction 
in a suit against him or her.345 Although related court rulings did 
not consistently reconcile with each other,346 in practice, if a judg-
ment would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, inter-
fere with the public administration, or if the effect of the judgment 
would restrain the government from acting or compel it to act, it 
could be considered as a judgment against the sovereign.347 
Applying these sets of rules to a fiduciary claim against 
government directors, who could be considered the government’s 
agents, it is possible that courts would treat these claims as against 
the government. After all, such a claim has the potential to interfere 
with the public administration or restrain the government’s action. 
In that case, it is arguable as to whether any waivers under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, the Tucker Act, or the Administrative 
Procedure Act can apply to the fiduciary claims here.348 Even 
though state courts find such claims are not precluded by the sover-
eign immunity doctrine, they, particularly Delaware courts, would 
tend to refrain from judging on this issue in order to prevent a 
confrontation with the federal government so as to preserve the 
state right to regulate corporate matters.349 According to Marcel 
                                                                                                                         
344 Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 314 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. 
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)). 
345 Id.; Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984). 
346 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 698 (1949). 
347 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963). 
348 In respect of the Federal Tort Claims Act, it is arguable as to whether a 
breach of fiduciary duty is a tort. In respect of the Administrative Procedure 
Act, it is also arguable as to whether the actions of government shareholders 
or directors are an exercise of agency authority. The Tucker Act could be a 
possible chance for fiduciary claimants. However, since court precedent sug-
gests a precondition to the Tucker Act that the government has established 
comprehensive federal control over those banks and thus taken on the fiduci-
ary duties, it is arguable as well, though no case law has opined on this issue. 
See Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, 
supra note 12, at 1326–45. 
349 Kahan & Rock, Implications for Delaware, supra note 12, at 426–30. They 
reference the Delaware court’s stay of In re Bear Stearns Cos. Shareholder 
Litigation case in favor of the New York court’s decision during the Financial 
Crisis, and infer that Delaware courts will tend to duck when the case impli-
cates a confrontation with the federal government. For their detailed reasons, 
see also Kahan & Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, 
 
734 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:667 
Kahan and Edward Rock, a potential vehicle for the Delaware 
courts to achieve this purpose may be Delaware Court of Chan-
cery Rule 19, which provides substantial flexibility for the court 
to dismiss the case on grounds that a necessary joinder for trying 
the fiduciary claim against government directors, i.e., the govern-
ment, is absent.350 In that case, government-owned banks can 
never claim the accountability of government directors. 
To ensure the accountability of government directors, Con-
gress needs to explicitly clarify the access to fiduciary claims against 
government directors. Government directors need to be account-
able and undertake their fiduciary duties. To the extent that such 
liability could be precluded, I propose that Congress should con-
sider clarifying it explicitly in the statutes by creating an enabling 
legislation to waive the government’s sovereign immunity with re-
gard to its involvement in corporate affairs of banks. This proposal 
is not unprecedented: Congress created such enabling legislation 
when establishing the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to bail 
out the savings and loan industry.351 Enhancing the accountability 
of government directors can also effectively mitigate political influ-
ence because government directors, fearing personal liabilities, 
would have less incentive to succumb to politicians’ requests. 
Reducing these political risks may further assist banks to raise 
private capital and increase the value of firms’ stock.352 
                                                                                                                         
supra note 12, at 1324–25; Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard 
Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use 
of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 713–17 (2009). 
350 See Kahan & Rock, Implications for Delaware, supra note 12, at 431–35. 
351 When establishing the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to bail out 
the savings and loan industry, Congress created such enabling legislation, which 
provided that the RTC may “sue and be sued in its corporate capacity in any 
court of competent jurisdiction.” 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(9)(E) (2006). A similar 
precedent also exists for the RFC during the Great Depression, where Congress 
passed similar statutes to waive the sovereign immunity of the RFC. Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation Act § 4; Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. J.G. Mehinan 
Corp., 312 U.S. 81, 84–86 (1941). See Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 
346–47. 
352 Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 6, at 316. On the other hand, some 
commentators also proposed some administrative review of an agency deci-
sion under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Shahabian, supra note 11, 
at 379–83. 
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5. Disclosure 
Finally, the government should disclose all actions and opin-
ions of government directors on any corporate affairs of banks to 
the public. The purpose of such disclosure is twofold. On the one 
hand, it ensures exposure of the political influence from politicians 
on these government directors to the sunshine. On the other hand, 
it also ensures that government directors are faithfully imple-
menting the government’s regulatory purpose and policy and 
communicates such purpose and policy to the public. 
In addition, when majority board members do not adopt 
the opinion of government directors, the bank should disclose it 
to the public. In such cases, disclosure can serve as an alarming 
signal for public investors and creditors. They can accordingly 
assess whether the decision of the business directors is excessively 
risky, or whether it is simply that the opinion of the government 
directors is less persuasive.353 
CONCLUSION 
This is a post–Financial Crisis era, where people still have 
fresh memories regarding the fragility of financial systems as well 
as the practice of government ownership. While the mainstream 
opinion in the United States disfavored government ownership of 
banks during the Financial Crisis, I provide some balanced analysis 
to make the case for it to prevent bias against this practice from 
evolving into blind antagonism. I believe that the U.S. banking sec-
tor should take a more positive view of government ownership of 
banks. The downsides should not be exaggerated, considering that 
the United States has antidotal institutions to handle them. The 
benefits should neither be obscured because of widespread antago-
nism against this practice. With complementary institutions and 
proper legal design, government ownership and directorship can be 
another useful tool for the regulator to improve risk management of 
banks and preserve their stability. While government ownership of 
banks may not function well in other jurisdictions, there should 
be a U.S. exception, under which the United States can make 
government ownership of banks a blessing instead of a curse!
                                                                                                                         
353 From a different perspective, Fisher proposed to improve the disclosure 
rules in respect of the government’s exercise of influence in changing the board 
members. See Fisher, supra note 122, at 585–98. 
